Practical Moore Sentences
Noûs (forthcoming)
Abstract
I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don’t know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this infelicity points to a striking psychological fact, with potentially broad ramifications concerning the structure of norms of speech acts: namely, when giving an order, we must act as if we believe we will be obeyed.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MANPMS-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-03-07
View upload history
View upload history

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Bratman, Michael
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.Lewis, David K.
Change in View.Harman, Gilbert
View all 36 references / Add more references

How to Do Things with Modals.Mandelkern, Matthew
Extended Epistemology.McKenna, Robin
Added to PP index
2019-03-07
Total views
149 ( #22,425 of 44,294 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
75 ( #8,118 of 44,294 )
2019-03-07
Total views
149 ( #22,425 of 44,294 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
75 ( #8,118 of 44,294 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.