Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception

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After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.
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Archival date: 2018-06-14
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How the Mind Works.Pinker, Steven

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Perceptual Pluralism.Quilty‚ÄźDunn, Jake
A Puzzle About Seeing for Representationalism.Openshaw, James & Weksler, Assaf

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