Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889 (2019)
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We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.

Author Profiles

John Schwenkler
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Eric Marcus
Auburn University


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