Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge

Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one is asserting is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm “Assert that p only if you believe that p”. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.
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MARAAT-54
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Archival date: 2018-08-29
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowing That P Without Believing That P.Myers-Schulz, Blake & Schwitzgebel, Eric
Practical Reality.Dancy, Jonathan

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