Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law

In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement- based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend to legal statements and disputes, and shares some important features with Toh’s (2011) idea that legal statements express shared acceptance of norms. The chapter proposes that a contextualist semantics for legal statements paired with the pragmatic communication of implicatures that express shared acceptances of norms, achieves the same goal that Toh aims at.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARHDA-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Ifs and Oughts.Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John

View all 56 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-09-20

Total views
181 ( #23,375 of 50,404 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #16,889 of 50,404 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.