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  1. added 2019-01-25
    Theories of Vagueness and Theories of Law.Alex Silk - forthcoming - Legal Theory.
    It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-20
    Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law.Teresa Marques - 2019 - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement- based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend (...)
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  3. added 2018-05-10
    Human Rights and the Forgotten Acts of Meaning in the Social Conventions of Conceptual Jurisprudence.William Conklin - 2014 - Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 2 (1):169-199.
    This essay claims that a rupture between two languages permeates human rights discourse in contemporary Anglo-American legal thought. Human rights law is no exception. The one language is written in the sense that a signifying relation inscribed by institutional authors represents concepts. Theories of law have shared such a preoccupation with concepts. Legal rules, doctrines, principles, rights and duties exemplify legal concepts. One is mindful of the dominant tradition of Anglo-American conceptual jurisprudence in this regard. Words have been thought to (...)
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  4. added 2018-05-10
    Derrida's Territorial Knowledge of Justice.William Conklin - 2012 - In Ruth Buchanan, Stewart Motha & Sunday Pahuja (eds.), Reading Modern Law: Critical Methodologies and Sovereign Formations. London: Rutledge. pp. 102-129.
    Peter Fitzpatrick’s writings prove once and for all that it is possible for a law professor to write in beautiful English. His work also proves once and for all that the dominating tradition of Anglo-American legal philosophy and of law teaching has been barking up the wrong tree: namely, that the philosopher and professional law teachers can understand justice as nested in empty forms, better known as rules, doctrines, principles, policies, and other standards. The more rigorous our analysis or decomposition (...)
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  5. added 2018-05-10
    'Access to Justice' as Access to a Lawyer's Language.William Conklin - 1990 - Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 10:454-467.
    This essay claims that ‘access to justice’ has erroneously been assumed to be synonymous with invisible concepts instead of access to a lawyer’s language. The Paper outlines how a language concerns the relation between signifiers, better known as word-images, on the one hand, with signfieds, better known as concepts, on the other. The signifieds are universal, artificial and empty in content. Taking the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an example, officials have assumed that Charter knowledge has involved signifieds (...)
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  6. added 2017-09-21
    Quasi-Expressivism About Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - forthcoming - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
    Speech and thought about what the law is commonly function in practical ways, to guide or assess behavior. These functions have often been seen as problematic for legal positivism in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart. One recent response is to advance an expressivist analysis of legal statements (Toh), which faces its own, familiar problems. This paper advances a rival, positivist-friendly account of legal statements which we call “quasi-expressivist”, explicitly modeled after Finlay’s metaethical theory of moral statements. This consists in a (...)
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  7. added 2017-04-21
    Why Judicial Formalism is Incompatible with the Rule of Law.Matczak Marcin - manuscript
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  8. added 2017-04-21
    Does Legal Interpretation Need Paul Grice?Matczak Marcin - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):67-87.
    By significantly diminishing the role intentions play in communication, in Imagination and Convention Lepore and Stone attempt to overthrow the Gricean paradigm which prevails in the philosophy of language. The approach they propose is attractive to theorists of legal interpretations for many reasons. Primary among these is that the more general dispute in the philosophy of language between Griceans and non-Griceans mirrors the dispute between intentionalists and non-intentionalists in legal interpretation. The ideas proposed in Imagination and Convention naturally support the (...)
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  9. added 2016-07-18
    Corporate Speech in Citizens United Vs. Federal Election Commission.Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - SpazioFilosofico 16:47-79.
    In its January 20th, 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, the United States Supreme Court ruled that certain restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations for political advocacy violate the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, (...)
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