It's a Colorful World

American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):71 - 80 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract: I defend the intuition that the phenomenology of our experience is right in attributing the colors we see to objects; but although colors are properties of objects, they are constitutively dependent on the perceiver’s experiences. I offer a metaphysical account for this primitivist intuition, in response to David Chalmers’ arguments against it, drawing inspiration from Aristotle’s theory of causation.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-09-01
Latest version: 2 (2016-09-01)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
104 ( #30,639 of 47,104 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #35,628 of 47,104 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.