Aristotle: Perception

Edited by Caleb Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver, University of Colorado Denver)
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  1. added 2019-11-09
    Percepção e imaginação em Aristóteles.Vitor Duarte Ferreira - 2017 - Dissertation, UFBA, Brazil
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  2. added 2019-08-21
    Is the Eye Like What It Sees? A Critique of Aristotle on Sensing by Assimilation.Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Vivarium 57 (3-4):268-292.
    Aristotle held that perception consists in the reception of external sensory qualities (or sensible forms) in the sensorium. This idea is repeated in many forms in contemporary philosophy, including, with regard to vision, in the idea (still not firmly rejected) that the retinal image consists of points of colour. In fact, this is false. Colour is a quality that is constructed by the visual system, and though it is possible to be a realist about colour, it is completely misleading to (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-04
    Aristotle's Peculiarly Human Psychology.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2019 - In Nora Kreft & Geert Keil (eds.), Aristotle's Anthropology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60-76.
    For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17– 1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31). In this (...)
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  4. added 2019-04-03
    Aristotle on Attention.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    I argue that a study of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Parva Naturalia shows that Aristotle had a notion of attention. This notion captures the common aspects of apparently different phenomena like perceiving something vividly, being distracted by a loud sound or by a musical piece, focusing on a geometrical problem. For Aristotle, these phenomena involve a specific selectivity that is the outcome of the competition between different cognitive stimuli. This selectivity is attention. I argue that Aristotle studied the (...)
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  5. added 2019-01-11
    Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, Christopher Shields. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):192-193.
    Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. By Shields Christopher.
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  6. added 2018-09-11
    Aristotle's Case for Perceptual Knowledge.Robert Howton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...)
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  7. added 2018-08-27
    Review of Erick Raphael Jiménez, Aristotle's Concept of Mind[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):162-163.
    In this ambitious first book, Erick Raphael Jiménez argues that a good model for understanding Aristotle’s concept of mind (nous) lies in Aristotle’s account of the perception of time. This “time-perception model” of mind and its activity, thinking, bridges a gap between Jiménez’s unorthodox readings of Aristotelian mind and its objects. The book will attract the interest of specialists in Aristotle’s psychology, as well as other scholars interested in Aristotle’s concept of mind and its influence, for instance, theologians interested in (...)
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  8. added 2018-08-27
    Direct Realism with and Without Representation: John Buridan and Durand of St.-Pourçain on Species.Peter Hartman - 2017 - In Gyula Klima (ed.), Questions on the soul by John Buridan and others. Berlin, Germany: Springer. pp. 107-129.
    As we now know, most, if not all, philosophers in the High Middle Ages agreed that what we immediately perceive are external objects and that the immediate object of perception must not be some image present to the mind. Yet most — but not all — philosophers in the High Middle Ages also held, following Aristotle, that perception is a process wherein the percipient takes on the likeness of the external object. This likeness — called a species — is a (...)
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  9. added 2018-08-27
    Thomas Aquinas and Durand of St.-Pourçain on Mental Representation.Peter Hartman - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (1):19-34.
    Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages agreed that what we immediately perceive are external objects. Yet most philosophers in the High Middle Ages also held, following Aristotle, that perception is a process wherein the perceiver takes on the form or likeness of the external object. This form or likeness — called a species — is a representation by means of which we immediately perceive the external object. Thomas Aquinas defended this thesis in one form, and Durand of St.-Pourçain, his (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-27
    Review of Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Notes, C.D.C. Reeve. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1.
    This is an excellent translation of Aristotle's De Anima or On the Soul, part of C.D.C. Reeve's impressive ongoing project of translating Aristotle's works for the New Hackett Aristotle. Reeve's translation is careful and accurate, committed to faithfully rendering Aristotle into English while making him as readable as possible. This edition features excellent notes that will greatly assist readers (especially in their inclusion of related passages that illuminate the sections they annotate) and an introduction that situates the work within Aristotle's (...)
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  11. added 2018-03-22
    Aristotle on Transparency.Mark Eli Kalderon - forthcoming - In Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhail (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera.
    A puzzle about the presentation of objects located at a distance is seen to animate Aristotle's account of transparency in De Anima and De Sensu.
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  12. added 2018-03-22
    Why the View of Intellect in De Anima I 4 Isn’T Aristotle’s Own.Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):241-254.
    In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s (...)
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  13. added 2018-03-22
    The Individuation of the Senses.Mohan Matthen - 2015 - In Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 567-586.
    How many senses do humans possess? Five external senses, as most cultures have it—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste? Should proprioception, kinaesthesia, thirst, and pain be included, under the rubric bodily sense? What about the perception of time and the sense of number? Such questions reduce to two. 1. How do we distinguish a sense from other sorts of information-receiving faculties? 2. By what principle do we distinguish the senses? Aristotle discussed these questions in the De Anima. H. P. Grice (...)
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  14. added 2018-03-22
    La perception et valorization de la philosophie arabe dans le Résumé de la Somme théologique de Saint Thomas d’Aquin de Georges Gennade Scholarios: les cas d’Avicenne et Averroès.Georgios Steiris & Nasia Lyckoura - 2013 - In G. Arabatzis (ed.), Marges de la Philosophie Byzantine. Institut du Livre - A.Kardamitsa. pp. 51-74.
    The article focuses on an unexamined so far aspect of byzantine philosophy, namely the influence of Arabic philosophy upon byzantine thinkers. Despite the vicinity of Byzantium and Arabic territories, the philosophical interactions were minimal. Scholarios claimed, in a dedicatory epistle to Constantine Paleologus (1405-1453), that he had studied the treatises of Avicenna, Averroes, and other Arab and Persian philosophers. He admitted that Averroes was beyond doubt the best commentator of Aristotle. Scholarios acknowledged that the study of the Arabs contributed immensely (...)
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  15. added 2018-03-22
    Nous and Aisthēsis: Two Cognitive Faculties in Aristotle.Adriana Renero - 2013 - Méthexis:103-120.
    In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi’s controversial thesis that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility” if not an “identity” of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b15, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi’s view is unpersuasive. I will show that Aristotle considers (...)
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  16. added 2018-03-22
    Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4.Caleb Cohoe - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (4):347-377.
    I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that (...)
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  17. added 2018-03-22
    Thomas Aquinas, Perceptual Resemblance, Categories, and the Reality of Secondary Qualities.Paul Symington - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:237-252.
    Arguably one of the most fundamental phase shifts that occurred in the intellectual history of Western culture involved the ontological reduction of secondary qualities to primary qualities. To say the least, this reduction worked to undermine the foundations undergirding Aristotelian thought in support of a scientific view of the world based strictly on an examination of the real—primary— qualities of things. In this essay, I identify the so-called “Causal Argument” for a reductive view of secondary qualities and seek to deflect (...)
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  18. added 2018-03-22
    Why Phenomenal Content is Not Intentional.Howard Robinson - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.
    I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
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  19. added 2018-03-22
    It's a Colorful World.Anna Marmodoro - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):71 - 80.
    Abstract: I defend the intuition that the phenomenology of our experience is right in attributing the colors we see to objects; but although colors are properties of objects, they are constitutively dependent on the perceiver’s experiences. I offer a metaphysical account for this primitivist intuition, in response to David Chalmers’ arguments against it, drawing inspiration from Aristotle’s theory of causation.
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  20. added 2018-03-22
    Toucher Et Proprioception.Olivier Massin & Jean-Maurice Monnoyer - 2003 - Voir (Barré) 26:48-73.
    Our thesis is that proprioception is not a sixth sense distinct from the sense of touch, but a part of that tactile (or haptic) sense. The tactile sense is defined as the sense whose direct intentional objects are macroscopic mechanical properties. We first argue (against D. Armstrong, 1962; B. O'Shaughnessy 1989, 1995, 1998 and M. Martin, 1992, 1993,1995) that the two following claims are incompatible : (i) proprioception is a sense distinct from touch; (ii) touch is a bipolar modality, that (...)
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  21. added 2018-03-22
    Cleansing the Doors of Perception: Aristotle on Induction.John R. Welch - 2001 - In Konstantine Boudouris (ed.), Greek Philosophy and Epistemology. International Association for Greek Philosophy.
    This chapter has two objectives. The first is to clarify Aristotle’s view of the first principles of the sciences. The second is to stake out a critical position with respect to this view. The paper sketches an alternative to Aristotle’s intuitionism based in part on the use of quantitative inductive logics.
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  22. added 2018-03-22
    Aristotle on the Sense Organs (Review). [REVIEW]J. A. Towey - 1999 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 119:192-193.
    Review of Johanson's book Aristotle on the sense organs. Aristotle seeks to explain the characteristics of the different sense organs by reference to the goal that they serve, that of enabling animals to perceive. A material basis is necessary for sense perception but it is an open question whether the material in question undergoes a physiological change.
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  23. added 2018-02-17
    Aristotle and Alexander on Perceptual Error.Mark A. Johnstone - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (3):310-338.
    Aristotle sometimes claims that the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that the perception of common perceptibles is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of. I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error can help (...)
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  24. added 2017-11-12
    A percepção dos sons vocálicos em Aristóteles.Túlio Cardoso Rebehy - 2008 - Dissertation, UFMG, Brazil
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  25. added 2017-08-17
    SENSO-PERCEPÇÃO NO DE ANIMA B DE ARISTÓTELES.Fernanda Pereira Augusto da Silva - 2011 - Dissertation, UFPB, Brazil
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  26. added 2016-03-30
    When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata: A Moderate Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Memoria and De Anima on the Role of Images in Intellectual Activities.Caleb Cohoe - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):337-372.
    I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...)
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  27. added 2015-10-07
    Aristotelian Aisthesis and the Violence of Suprematism.Ryan Drake - 2013 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):49-66.
    Kazimir Malevich’s style of Suprematist painting represents the inauguration of nothing less than a new form of culture premised upon a demolition of the Western tradition’s reifying habits of objective thought. In ridding his canvases of all objects and mimetic conventions, Malevich sought to reconfigure human perception in such a way as to open consciousness to alternative modes of organization and signification. In this paper, I argue that Malevich’s revolutionary aesthetic strategy can be illuminated by a return to the very (...)
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  28. added 2015-06-11
    Reply to Ganson.Mark Eli Kalderon - forthcoming - In Henrik Lagerlund & Mikko Yrjönsuuri (eds.), Mechanisms of Sense perception. Springer.
    A reply to Todd Ganson’s “Was Aristotle a Naïve Realist”, a talk for a conference in Gothenburg Sweden 12-14 June 2015 entitled The Mechanisms of Sense Perception in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition.
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  29. added 2014-09-24
    Touching, Thinking, Being: The Sense of Touch in Aristotle's De Anima and its Implications.Pascal Massie - 2013 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):74-101.
    Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Touching is the commonest and lowest power; it is possessed by all sentient beings; thinking is, on the contrary, the highest faculty that distinguishes human beings. Yet, while Aristotle maintains against some of his predecessors that to think is not to sense, he nevertheless posits a causal link between practical intelligence and tactility and even describes noetic activity as a certain kind of touch. This essay elucidates (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-25
    Aristotle on Illusory Perception: Phantasia Without Phantasmata.Noell Birondo - 2001 - Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):57-71.
    In De Anima III.3 Aristotle presents his official discussion of phantasia (“imagination” in most translations). At the very outset of the discussion Aristotle offers as an endoxon that “phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us” (428a1-2). Now a natural reading of this claim, taken up by many commentators, can pose a problem for Aristotle’s overall account of perception. Here I argue that, although it would be silly to deny that Aristotle considers phantasia (...)
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  31. added 2013-08-30
    Aristotle on Sounds.Mark A. Johnstone - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):631-48.
    In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle 's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle 's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle 's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and (...)
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  32. added 2013-08-30
    Aristotle on Odour and Smell.Mark A. Johnstone - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:143-83.
    The sense of smell occupies a peculiar intermediate position within Aristotle's theory of sense perception: odours, like colours and sounds, are perceived at a distance through an external medium of air or water; yet in their nature they are intimately related to flavours, the proper objects of taste, which for Aristotle is a form of touch. In this paper, I examine Aristotle's claims about odour and smell, especially in De Anima II.9 and De Sensu 5, to see what light they (...)
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  33. added 2013-08-08
    Aristotle on 'First Transitions' in De Anima II 5.John Bowin - 2012 - Apeiron 45 (3):262-282.
    At De Anima II 5, 417b17, Aristotle says, ‘The first transition (πρώτη μεταβολή) in that which can perceive is brought about by the parent, and when it is born it already has [the faculty of] sense-perception in the same way as it has knowledge. Actual sense-perception is so spoken of in the same way as contemplation.’ The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of first transitions.
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  34. added 2013-08-08
    Aristotle on Various Types of Alteration in De Anima II 5.John Bowin - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (2):138-161.
    In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among (...)
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  35. added 2013-05-13
    Form Without Matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study of perception, taking as its starting point a puzzle in Empedocles' theory of vision: if perception is a mode of material assimilation, how can we perceive colors at a distance? Kalderon argues that the theory of perception offered by Aristotle in answer to the puzzle is both attractive and defensible.
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  36. added 2013-04-20
    De Anima Ii 5 on the Activation of The Senses.John Bowin - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (1):87-104.
    This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s identification, in De Anima 2.5, of αἴσθησις with an ἀλλοίωσίς τις that is not ‘a kind of destruction of something by its contrary’. Drawing on a passage from Metaphysics Iota 5, it argues that when so described, what is referred to as an ἀλλοίωσίς τις is not a uniquely perceptual alteration.
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  37. added 2013-03-30
    Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving.Theodor Ebert - 1983 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37 (2):181 - 198.
    The paper discusses the active part in the process of perceiving, usually expressed by the Greek word krinein. It is argued that krinein in one of its uses means "to judge" in the sense of judging a case, i. e. deciding it. It is not used for making statements. A second meaning of the Greek word is that of discerning or discriminating, and it is this meaning that plays a central part in Aristotle's theory of perception.
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