Realismo Moral Naturalista: Problemas Semânticos

Dissertation, Universidade Federal Do Rio de Janeiro (2010)
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Abstract
As the intuitions about moral phenomenology shows the metaphysical distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties has set the metaethical distinction between normativity and objectivity in ethics. Traditionally, many arguments were built in order to show that moral realists cannot account, in naturalist vocabulary, for the process of determining moral reference due to the desiderative disposition taken to be necessarily part of the meaning of moral terms. This dissertation assess some anti-realists arguments like is-ought thesis, the argument from queerness, the argument from relativity and the open question argument. In what follows I propose the semantics elaborated by Cornell realism in order to address these arguments, especially the open question argument. However, as Moral Twin Earth test shows us the semantic proposed by Boyd is incomplete. Therefore I also evaluate a second attempt taken by Cornell realists such as Brink and Copp, based on Putnan's notion of referential intentions.
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