Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323 (2003)
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Abstract

At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and that, accordingly, the argument from intuition fails.

Author Profiles

Eric Margolis
University of British Columbia
Stephen Laurence
University of Sheffield

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