Transcendental Arguments for Personal Identity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction

Philo 14 (2):109-136 (2011)
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Abstract
One of the principle aims of the B version of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to show how it is possible that the same “I think” can accompany all of my representations, which is a transcendental condition of the possibility of judgment. Contra interpreters such as A. Brook, I show that this “I think” is an a priori (reflected) self-consciousness; contra P. Keller, I show that this a priori self-consciousness is first and foremost a consciousness of one’s personal identity from a first person point of view
ISBN(s)
1098-3570
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARTAF-6
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Archival date: 2013-07-19
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Kant on Self-Identity.Kitcher, Patricia

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2013-06-12

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