What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but…” Reasoning?

In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Disability-positive philosophers often note a troubling tendency to dismiss what disabled people say about their well-being. This chapter seeks to get clearer on why this tendency might be troubling. It argues that recent appeals to lived experience, testimonial injustice, and certain challenges to adaptive-preference reasoning do not fully explain what is wrong with questioning the happiness of disabled people. It then argues that common attempts to debunk the claim that disabled people are happy are worrisome because they threaten everyone’s well-being and are further challenged by an argument from moral risk.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARWWW-13
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-02-27
Latest version: 6 (2019-03-01)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Running Risks Morally.Weatherson, Brian

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-02-27

Total views
97 ( #24,986 of 40,598 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
97 ( #4,671 of 40,598 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.