Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism

Noûs 51 (3):565-593 (2017)
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Abstract
This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this view
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Archival date: 2013-11-05
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2013-11-05

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