Consciousness, Causation, and Confusion

Review of Philosophy and Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In recent decades, various sources of scientific evidence have been used to disprove the idea that we have free will. Conceptual confusion has tended to lurk behind such claims, however, for it often turns out that what researchers mean by “free will” is something extremely implausible. A similar problem persists in the literature on the causal role of consciousness. Various sources of psychological evidence have been used to show that consciousness is not among the causes of our behaviour. However, consciousness is often assumed to be both non-physical and non-functional, and causation is often poorly understood or not defined at all. The aim of this paper is to clear up these issues by urging that (1) future research on this topic remains neutral on the metaphysics of consciousness, (2) avoids assuming that phenomenal consciousness is functionless, (3) is more precise in specifying what is doing the causal work when discussing conscious mental states, and (4) adopts the practice of being clearer on what it takes for something to count as a cause. Much unwarranted scepticism about whether consciousness is causally efficacious has resulted from this fragmented thinking, and much is to be gained by clearing it up.

Author's Profile

Darryl Mathieson
Australian National University

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