Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism [Book Review]

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MATDEA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-12-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-12-03

Total views
493 ( #5,723 of 41,622 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #17,004 of 41,622 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.