In defence of the Four-Case Argument

Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1963-1982 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument was once considered to be the most powerful of the manipulation arguments against compatibilism. However, because of Demetriou’s :595–617, 2010) response, Pereboom has significantly weakened his argument. Manipulation arguments in general have also been challenged by King : 65–83, 2013). In this paper, I argue that the Four-Case Argument resists both these challenges. One upshot is that Pereboom doesn’t need weaken his argument. Another is that compatibilists still need a response the Four-Case Argument. And another is that we get a much better understanding of the Four-Case Argument, and of manipulation arguments more generally, than is currently available in the literature.

Author's Profile

Benjamin Matheson
University of Bern

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-24

Downloads
471 (#34,107)

6 months
157 (#18,325)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?