Leibnizin vastaväitteitä molinistiselle voluntarismille (in Finnish) [Leibniz's Objections to Molinist Voluntarism]

Ajatus 72:53-69 (2015)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explain and discuss Leibniz’s main objections to the Molinist-Suárezian voluntarist (libertarian) conception of freedom, i.e., the conception involving the supposition of “freedom of indifference” of the will to make contrary choices in exactly the same circumstances. Leibniz’s main objections to the voluntarist conception are the following: (i) it violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason; (ii) it is based on a mistaken picture of the nature of the will.

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Ari Maunu
University of Turku

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