Hume's Fallacy: Miracles, Probability, and Frequency

Abstract

Frequency-based arguments against rational belief in a miracle occurring have been present for centuries, the most notable being from David Hume. In this essay, I will show Hume's argument rests on an equivocation of probability, with him using the term interchangeably to refer to two different and incompatible perspectives: Bayesianism and Frequentism. Additionally, I will show that any frequentist arguments against miracles relies on a view of probability that is only dubiously linked to rationality. In other words, the frequentist cannot have it both ways: if probability is indeed frequency, then miracles are indeed improbable but not necessarily irrational to believe. On the other hand, if probability is an agent's confidence in a given belief, than under certain assumptions miracles are indeed highly probable and thus rational to believe despite their rarity. As a result, regardless of which view of probability one takes, it does not follow that believing in a miracle is irrational simply because miracles are rare.

Author's Profile

Paul Mayer
Rice University

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-12-11

Downloads
10 (#102,264)

6 months
10 (#101,097)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?