Abstract

Frequency-based arguments against rational belief in a miracle occurring have been present for centuries, the most notable being from David Hume. In this essay, the authors show Hume's argument rests on an equivocation of probability, with him using the term interchangeably to refer to two different and incompatible perspectives: Bayesianism and Frequentism. Additionally, the authors show that any frequentist arguments against miracles relies on a view of probability that is only dubiously linked to rationality. In other words, the frequentist cannot have it both ways: if probability is indeed frequency, then miracles are indeed improbable but not necessarily irrational to believe. On the other hand, if probability is an agent's confidence in a given belief, than under certain assumptions miracles are indeed highly probable and thus rational to believe despite their rarity. As a result, regardless of which view of probability one takes, it does not follow that believing in a miracle is irrational simply because miracles are rare.