On the very concept of free will

Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866 (2014)
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Abstract
Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists
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First archival date: 2014-02-24
Latest version: 4 (2014-11-10)
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References found in this work BETA
Free Will and Luck.Mele, Alfred R.
Verbal Disputes.Chalmers, David J.

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Citations of this work BETA
In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Buckwalter, Wesley & Turri, John

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2014-02-24

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