Dwa typy modeli w nauce a problem odkrycia i zagadnienie reprezentacji

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Abstract
In the article the models which are reconstructed in the philosophy of science from the praxis of science are divided into two main types: 1) analogue and metaphor-based models and 2) representational models. I examine functions of the models of both the types, and demonstrate that the models of type 1) are used in science as instruments of acquiring new knowledge on the basis of a knowledge accepted earlier; and models of type 2) are used to create cognitive “images” of reality. I demonstrate that in the philosophy of science the problem areas generated by two functions of models are entirely isolated one from another. Whereas they are non-separably linked one to another. I postulate the necessity of linking them in one unified conception of models, and then in one conception of science. Therefore such a conception of models is needed which will explain how models play two functions simultaneously, i.e. how they function in the context of discovery and how they rep-resent reality.
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Archival date: 2019-07-16
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2019-07-16

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