On Armstrong’s Difficulties with Adequate Truthmaking Restrictions

Journal of Philosophical Research 44:145-156 (2019)
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Abstract

D. M. Armstrong rejects various ontologies that posit truths without truthmakers. But, lest proponents of such questionable ontologies postulate suspicious truthmakers in a bid to regain ontological respectability, Armstrong requires a plausible restriction on truthmaking that eliminates such ontologies. I discuss three different candidate restrictions: categorical, natural, and intrinsic difference-making. While the categorical and natural restrictions eliminate the questionable ontologies, they also eliminate Armstrong’s own ontology. The intrinsic difference-making restriction, on the other hand, fails to eliminate any of them. Thus Armstrong lacks a principled reason for rejecting such ontologies.

Author's Profile

Brannon McDaniel
University of Richmond

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