Against the Taking Condition

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331 (2016)
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Abstract

According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious prima facie problems and the reasons which have been offered in favour of it fail to convince.

Author Profiles

Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton

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