Fittingness First

Ethics 126 (3):575-606 (2016)
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Abstract
According to the fitting-attitudes account of value, for X to be good is for it to be fitting to value X. But what is it for an attitude to be fitting? A popular recent view is that it is for there to be sufficient reason for the attitude. In this paper we argue that proponents of the fitting-attitudes account should reject this view and instead take fittingness as basic. In this way they avoid the notorious ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem, and can offer attractive accounts of reasons and good reasoning in terms of fittingness.
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Archival date: 2015-08-13
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.

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