Clifford and the Common Epistemic Norm

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):245-258 (2016)
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Abstract
This paper develops a “Cliffordian” argument for a common epistemic norm governing belief, action, and assertion. The idea is that beliefs are the sorts of things that lead to actions and assertions. What each of us believes influences what we act on and assert, and in turn influences what those around us believe, act on, and assert. Belief, action, and assertion should be held to a common epistemic norm because, otherwise, this system will become contaminated. The paper finishes by drawing out the relativistic implications of the Cliffordian argument.
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Archival date: 2016-09-07
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2016-09-07

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