Why assertion and practical reasoning are possibly not governed by the same epistemic norm

Logos and Episteme 4 (4):457-464 (2013)
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Abstract
This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm (“Why assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly [2013]). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
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2013
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MCKWAA
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Archival date: 2013-12-09
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2013-12-09

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