Affective Reason

Episteme (forthcoming)
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This paper contributes to the recent explosion of literature on the epistemological role of emotions and other affective states by defending two claims. First, affective states might do more than position us to receive evidence or function as evidence. Affective states might be thought toappraiseevidence, in the sense that affective states influence what doxastic state is rational for someone given a body of evidence. The second claim is that affective evidentialism, the view that affective states function rationally in this way, is not just possible but plausible and fruitful. We offer two arguments in favor of affective evidentialism.

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Timothy Pickavance
Biola University


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