Authoritatively Normative Concepts

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers ‘schmagency’-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help realists, error theorist, and fictionalists address central challenges to their views.
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Archival date: 2017-10-30
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The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael

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Citations of this work BETA
Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Ballantyne, Nathan & Coffman, E. J.
Defining Normativity.Finlay, Stephen

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2017-10-30

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