The problem of the man who met death in Damascus appeared in the infancy of the theory of rational choice known as causal decision theory. A straightforward, unadorned version of causal decision theory is presented here and applied, along with Brian Skyrms’ deliberation dynamics, to Death in Damascus and similar problems. Decision instability is a fascinating topic, but not a source of difficulty for causal decision theory. Andy Egan’s purported counterexample to causal decision theory, (...) Murder Lesion, is considered; a simple response shows how Murder Lesion and similar examples fail to be counterexamples, and clarifies the use of the unadorned theory in problems of decision instability. I compare unadorned causal decision theory to previous treatments by Frank Arntzenius and by Jim Joyce, and recommend a well-founded heuristic that all three accounts can endorse. Whatever course deliberation takes, causal decision theory is consistently a good guide to rational action. (shrink)

Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I'll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage's Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it.

A review of some major topics of debate in normative decision theory from circa 2007 to 2019. Topics discussed include the ongoing debate between causal and evidential decision theory, decision instability, risk-weighted expected utility theory, decision-making with incomplete preferences, and decision-making with imprecise credences.

Andy Egan recently drew attention to a class of decision situations that provide a certain kind of informational feedback, which he claims constitute a counterexample to causal decision theory. Arntzenius and Wallace have sought to vindicate a form of CDT by describing a dynamic process of deliberation that culminates in a “mixed” decision. I show that, for many of the cases in question, this proposal depends on an incorrect way of calculating expected utilities, and argue that it (...) is therefore unsuccessful. I then tentatively defend an alternative proposal by Joyce, which produces a similar process of dynamic deliberation but for a different reason. (shrink)

Instability occurs when the very fact of choosing one particular possible option rather than another affects the expected values of those possible options. In decision theory: An act is stable iff given that it is actually performed, its expected utility is maximal. When there is no stable choice available, the resulting instability can seem to pose a dilemma of practical rationality. A structurally very similar kind of instability, which occurs in cases of anti-expertise, can likewise seem (...) to create dilemmas of epistemic rationality. One possible line of response to such cases of instability, suggested by both Jeffrey (1983) and Sorensen (1987), is to insist that a rational agent can simply refuse to accept that such instability applies to herself in the first place. According to this line of thought it can be rational for a subject to discount even very strong empirical evidence that the anti-expertise condition obtains. I present a new variety of anti-expertise condition where no particular empirical stage-setting is required, since the subject can deduce a priori that an anti-expertise condition obtains. This kind of anti-expertise case is therefore not amenable to the line of response that Jeffrey and Sorensen recommend. (shrink)

In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has (...) surprising implications for a number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected. (shrink)

I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. This decision should lead causalists to a better understanding of what it takes for a decision between some collection of options to count as a subdecision of a decision between a larger (...) collection of options. And with this better understanding of subdecisions in hand, causalists will not violate the IIA or the NEE. This decision will also teach causalists that, in sequential decisions, a rational agent may be led to make a series of choices which are causally dominated by some other sequence of choices they could have made instead. I will encourage causalists to recognise this as an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons. (shrink)

To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...) influence your estimate of the value of doing it; deliberation dynamics provides a framework for modeling such interactions. A distinction is drawn between sensitivity to the magnitude of the stakes, and sensitivity to the shape of the stakes. Contexts of extended deliberation are settings in which some beliefs that p rationally depend on the shape of the stakes on p. The dependence is either rational stake-sensitivity or an outcome of rational learning; empirical evidence concerning contexts of deliberation may lead us to model rational beliefs in one way or the other. (shrink)

Jack Spencer argues we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it's incompatible with this principle: If you know that you will choose an option, x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x. I agree with Spencer that defenders of MaxRat should reject this principle. However, I disagree insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are in a position to accept (...) it. Both orthodox CDT and Spencer's own theory of rational choice are incompatible with the principle as well. It is surprising to realise, but all are agreed: it can be irrational to knowingly choose the best. (shrink)

A one-boxer, Erica, and a two-boxer, Chloe, engage in a familiar debate. The debate begins with Erica asking Chloe: ‘If you’re so smart, then why ain’cha rich?’. As the debate progresses, Chloe is led to endorse a novel causalist theory of rational choice. This new theory allows Chloe to forge a connection between rational choice and long-run riches. In brief: Chloe concludes that it is not long-run wealth but rather long-run wealth creation which is symptomatic of rationality.

Today decision-makers face surging increases in overall system complexity leading up to more unstable and unpredictable business environments. Leaders and decision-makers are confronted with volatility (dynamic and intense changes), uncertainty (lack of predictability), complexity (interconnection of parts which is sometimes overwhelmingly difficult to process), and ambiguity (unclear relationships), namely the VUCA-world. The implications of the VUCA-world for business and strategy can be applied to the rise of complex cyber-physical systems in Industry 4.0. There is an expressed need to (...) develop complexity management frameworks that integrate different individual measures of dealing with industrial system complexity into a synergetic strategic framework. In this regard new frameworks that reflect “real-life complexity” of industrial systems and their practitioners are being called for. It is therefore the core aim of the thesis to develop and apply a strategic complexity management framework (SCM) that fits in the individual reality of the decision-making practitioner by integrating different complexity dimensions of industrial systems in a holistic, synergetic, and strategic way. As a starting point for achieving this aim, an investigation and exploration of relevant theoretical frameworks is conducted and accumulates in the proposition of a set of hypotheses H1-H13 as an explanatory approach to achieve a multi-dimensional definition of industrial system complexity and to explore its impact on decision-making based on information growth in industrial systems. In a second step, H1-H13 are applied to develop a theoretical complexity space model for industrial systems. In the model the static and dynamic complexity of an industrial system are integrated in a complexity space modelling approach, where information complexity boundaries expand over time in a static compound space of a system and serve as an indicator for system instability in a static complexity space. The capabilities of the complexity space model are theoretically demonstrated, alongside a set of assumptions concerning the behavior of industrial system complexity. The developed complexity space model represents the core theoretical foundation for the establishment of the SCM in a third step. In the third step the complexity of an industrial system is captivated via the strategic complexity management framework (SCM) in the form of a strategic 8- quadrant matrix in adherence to the axioms of the paradigm of strategic complexity engineering which are to acknowledge, characterize, anticipate, and manage complexity. Definitions of static, dynamic and environmental conception of complexity of industrial systems are holistically integrated to capture the internal and external strategic management perspective in the SCM framework and the strategic capabilities of the SCM framework are theoretically demonstrated based on a set of generic norm strategies. In a fourth step the SCM is applied for strategic complexity management purposes to four different real-world cases of industrial manufacturing systems with the goal to test, explore and discuss the practical decision-aiding applicability of the framework via an interventionistic multi-case study based on qualitative document review. The individual results of the SCM application on the four different cases are described and discussed. Key-learnings across cases are identified and discussed as a conclusion. Finally, a research outlook is provided. (shrink)

With an increased emphasis on upstream activity and Defence Engagement, it has become increasingly more important for the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and government to understand the relationship between conflict and regional instability. As part of this process, the Historical and Operational Data Analysis Team (HODA) in Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) was tasked to look at factors that influenced the regional spread of internal conflicts to help aid the decision making of government. Conflict contagion is (...) the process by which a conflict in one state (State A) influences the outbreak of conflict in another state (State B). The aim of looking at these factors was to produce a tool to assist in the cost/benefit analysis of intervening in future conflicts. The task was carried out by quantitatively studying a selection of contagion and non-contagion case studies over a set of 14 numerical variables that covered structural, political, socioeconomic and cultural factors of both States A and B. All case studies took place after the end of the Cold War. The dataset used contained both binary and continuous data. A range of statistical techniques were used including correlation, regression and principal component analyses along with graphical analytical methods. Unfortunately creating a tool to predict contagion has proven difficult and so the scope of the study was changed-as no statistically relevant link was found. However, it was shown that some links do exists between the variables and the existence of contagion, and it also appears it is a combination of variables which has an effect on the likelihood of contagion. Conflict contagion is a rare event and was only recorded in less than 1% of cases present in the dataset. Of the variables analysed, the most significant factor was the number of refugees present in State B who originated in State A for the year before the case study. It is recommended that further work be conducted. It is possible that a more detailed investigation, using a broader range of techniques and/or a wider selection of variables might be successful in assessing the likelihood of conflict contagion. (shrink)

The linear programming method is one of the important methods of operations research that has been used to address many practical issues and provided optimal solutions for many institutions and companies, which helped decision makers make ideal decisions through which companies and institutions achieved maximum profit, but these solutions remain ideal and appropriate in If the conditions surrounding the work environment are stable, because any change in the data provided will affect the optimal solution and to avoid losses and (...) achieve maximum profit, we have, in previous research, reformulated the linear models using the concepts of neutrosophic science, the science that takes into account the instability of conditions and fluctuations in the work environment and leaves nothing to chance. While taking data, neutrosophic values carry some indeterminacy, giving a margin of freedom to decision makers. In another research, we reformulated one of the most important methods used to solve linear models, which is the simplex method, using the concepts of this science, and as a continuation of what we did in the previous two researches, we will reformulate in this research. The graphical method for solving linear models using the concepts of neutrosophics. We will also shed light on a case that is rarely mentioned in most operations research references, which is that when the difference between the number of unknowns and the number of constraints is equal to one, two, or three, we can also find the optimal solution graphically for some linear models. This is done by taking advantage of the conditions of non-negativity that linear models have, and we will explain this through an example in which the difference is equal to two. Also, through examples, we will explain the difference between using classical values and neutrosophic values and the extent of this’s impact on the optimal solution. (shrink)

Historically, the view, prevalent in contemporary economics and decision theory as well as philosophy, that rational action consists simply in satisfying one’s desires, whatever they may be, as efficiently as possible, is to be found first in Book II of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. This view has counterintuitive and self-refuting implications, in that it recognizes as rational behavior that may reveal a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Accordingly, many Hume scholars have tried to show recently (...) that this view was not Hume’s; and that, on the contrary, Hume did supply an account of rational final ends--in his discussion of the calm passions, the “steady and general view” that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual’s desires and perceptions, and elsewhere. But a detailed reconstruction of Hume’s views on these matters that assembles all the relevant texts does not support this thesis. Instead, it undermines it. Hence the counterintuitive and self-refuting implications of Hume’s view of rational action must be allowed to stand. (shrink)

A standard problem with the objectivity of social scientific theory in particular is that it is either self-referential, in which case it seems to undermine itself as ideology, or self-excepting, which seem pragmatically self-refuting. Using the example of Marx and his theory of ideology, I show how self-referential theories that include themselves in their scope of explanation can be objective. Ideology may be roughly defined as belief distorted by class interest. I show how Marx thought that natural science was informed (...) by class interest but not therefore necessarily ideology. Capitalists have an interest in understanding the natural world (to a point) so that they can manipulate it for profit. Their survival in the marketplace often depends on their competitive success in doing so. The fact that their interventions into nature, driven by class interest, often succeed, is evidence of the reliability and truth of their natural scientific theories. -/- With social science, capitalists have a partial interest in understanding the world, so that they may maintain their class power, ideological hegemony, and a reasonably stable and self-reproducing economy. Some bourgeois social science, Marx thinks, is therefore vindicated the same way that natural science is, because of, not despite, its success in promoting the class interests that cause it. But the capitalist class, Marx thinks, also has an interest in obfuscating the truth about the social world. It would undermine the stability of capitalism, for example, for the bourgeoisie to adopt what Marx thinks to be the correct social theory, Marxism, and proclaim to the world that capitalism is exploitative and unstable. Capitalism creates a a need for ideological social theories that, driven by class interest, represent capitalism as just, natural, inevitable, and unalterable. If Marxism is correct, while these theories may further capitalist interests, they will not withstand the test of time as capitalist exploitation and instability engenders countersystemic political action. -/- How, then can we know, according to Marx, that Marxism is correct, as applied to itself? In part it is whether it succeeds in further the class interests that cause it. If workers adopt bourgeois theories and Marxism is right, they will find themselves frustrated in pursuit of goals that they have, such as improving their well-being, and if Marxism is wrong, then those theories will help them further their own goals. Similarly with Marxism: if it is right, then workers who adopt it should in the long run have more success in furthering their own goals, and if not, then not. But it is question begging to say that our confidence in the reliability of Marxism is enhanced by its successful promotion of goals that capitalists do not have but (according to Marxism) workers do. To avoid this problem it is necessary to compare the relative success of each sort of theory in promoting the interests and needs that the respective classes have independently of the theory, as well as by the usual criteria of scientific theory choice. -/- Thus the Soviet variant of Marxism was fairly decisively refuted by its failure to generate the support of its own designated constituency necessary to grow and survive. Whether the same is true of other varieties of Marxism or of capitalist social theory, it is, as Zhou En Lai said when asked whether the French Revolution had succeeded, too soon to tell, at least in any definitive way. However, and this is the point of the paper, an objective test of Marxism is possible even though Marxism says that all theory is informed by class interest. The question is whether the interests are in discovering or obfuscating the truth. The point is not limited to Marx, but applies to any self-referential social scientific theory that includes itself in its scope. -/- Keywords: ideology, self-referential theory, self-reference, reliabilism, objectivity, Marx, Marxism, sociology of science, class interest, classes, capitalism, bourgeoisie, workers, working class, social theory of knowledge, confirmation of scientific theory. (shrink)

The hotel sector of the travel industry is the leader according to the indicator of economic growth, which is observed in both developed and developing countries. Even under the economic instability and global natural disasters, the industry has seen growth in recent years. The franchising model for expanding activities is central to all successful hotel chains. The article deals with the franchising model for the travel business expansion and the economic performance of hotel chains such as Marriott International, Wyndham (...) Hotels, and Hilton. They hold a prominent place in the global hotel business, have a steady tendency to expand their business, hold high positions in the ranking of the best franchises in the world and have been recognized by experts. The main risks for the franchisor and franchisee are determined when making a decision on the expansion of the international travel business, which must be taken into account when developing new markets for hotel chains. The main advantages of the franchising model of expansion, which promote understanding between the parties of the franchise agreement, dynamicize hotel chains expansion and allow for reducing their expenses and increasing incomes. It was found that the growth of net profit and total income in the indicated hotel chains was due to the increase in the number of rooms in franchising and the positive dynamics of franchise income. A more dynamic pace occurred after the crisis growth in revenues from the franchisee compared with the managerial model. A closer relationship between revenues and key financial indicators has been proved when using a franchising model. (shrink)

The results of the authors’ research in a scientific monograph are devoted to solving the problems of forming and improving new concepts and strategies for managing economic systems, and mechanisms for their implementation in the context of modern world challenges to society on the basis of models of managing economic entities. An important component of the scientific monograph is the formation of modern strategies for increasing the competitiveness of economic systems, improving corporate structures, innovative restructuring of enterprises, ensuring environmental safety, (...) approaches to implementing a supply chain logistics management system, making effective decisions in the forecasting system, developing e-commerce, implementation of information technologies in project financing, controlling, education system, etc. The research results presented in the scientific monograph reflect the theoretical and practical aspects of the implementation of organizational-economic mechanisms for managing economic systems in the context of modern world challenges, conditions of constantly changing market conditions and instability of markets for goods and services, preservation and optimization of the resource potential of economic entities, the introduction of modern innovative technologies and digitalization of economic activities. (shrink)

National security is one of the most critical elements for Vietnam society, economy and political system, their stability, sustainability and prosperity. It is unconditionally the top priority for Vietnamese government, State, Communist Party and military forces. In the contemporary world with advanced technology and rapid globalization process taking place, beside many extant economic, social and political benefits there are many appearing challenges and threats that could endanger and destabilize the current socio-economic and political system of any country, including Vietnam. The (...) security issues and concerns understood by those challenges and threats are posed for the international and national community, both from outside and from within. The national security issues and concerns should be constantly screened and updated as the world is evolving at unprecedented pace, with particular exposure to the rising, but not yet fully identified, unconventional challenges and threats that have never seen before. The article is using empirical analysis and case study as methodology for carrying out research, treating security and military science as interdisciplinary, but two of the branches of social science. The aim of this article is to focus on internal instability as challenging security issue that could pose a real threat and danger to the current socio-economic and political system and based on that to draw some implications and propose some viable solutions for the Vietnamese authority to guard the safety and security of the people, society and also its political existence. (shrink)

Nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep is associated with fading consciousness in humans. Recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated the spatiotemporal alterations of the brain functional connectivity (FC) in NREM sleep, suggesting the changes of information integration in the sleeping brain. However, the common stationarity assumption in FC does not satisfactorily explain the dynamic process of information integration during sleep. The dynamic FC (dFC) across brain networks is speculated to better reflect the time-varying information propagation during sleep. Accordingly, we conducted simultaneous EEG-fMRI (...) recordings involving 12 healthy men during sleep and observed dFC across sleep stages using the sliding-window approach. We divided dFC into two aspects: mean dFC (dFCmean) and variance dFC (dFCvar). A high dFCmean indicates stable brain network integrity, whereas a high dFCvar indicates instability of information transfer within and between functional networks. For the network-based dFC, the dFCvar were negatively correlated with the dFCmean across the waking and three NREM sleep stages. As sleep deepened, the dFCmean decreased (N0~N1 > N2 > N3), whereas the dFCvar peaked during the N2 stage (N0~N1 < N3 < N2). The highest dFCvar during the N2 stage indicated the unstable synchronizations across the entire brain. In the N3 stage, the overall disrupted network integration was observed through the lowest dFCmean and elevated dFCvar, compared with N0 and N1. Conclusively, when the network specificity (dFCmean) breaks down, the consciousness dissipates with increasing variability of information exchange (dFCvar). (shrink)

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents (...) with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected. (shrink)

I consider Glimcher's claim to have given an account of mental functioning that is at once neurological and decision-theoretical. I am skeptical, but remark on some good ideas of Glimcher's.

Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to (...) resolve the indeterminacy relevant to a given choice-situation, but such capricious choices once made constrain how they will choose in the future. The account is illustrated by the case of self-interested action in situations where it is indeterminate whether you yourself will survive to benefit or suffer the consequences. The conclusion emphasizes some distinctive anti-hedging predictions of the account. (shrink)

Evidential decision theory (EDT) says that the choiceworthiness of an option depends on its evidential connections to possible outcomes. Causal decision theory (CDT) holds that it depends on your beliefs about its causal connections. While Newcomb cases support CDT, Arif Ahmed has described examples that support EDT. A new account is needed to get all cases right. I argue that an option A's choiceworthiness is determined by the probability that a good outcome ensues at possible A‐worlds that match (...) actuality in the facts causally unaffected by your decision (the “unaffected facts”). Moreover, you should evaluate A on the assumption that A is compossible with the unaffected facts. This view entails that you should use EDT when evaluating A on the assumption that the unaffected facts determine your action, but use CDT when assessing A on the opposite assumption. A's choiceworthiness equals a weighted average of these conditional assessments. The weights are determined by your beliefs about whether the unaffected fact determine your action. This account gets both Newcomb and Ahmed cases right. According to an influential view, whether you take the unaffected facts to determine your action can make a difference to whether you can regard yourself as free and the action as being under your control. While my account is neutral on this issue, it entails that whether you take the unaffected facts to determine your action is important in a different way: it matters to whether you should follow EDT or CDT. (shrink)

This paper argues that popular criticisms of semantic holism (such as that it leaves the ideas of translation, disagreement and change of mind problematic) are more properly directed at an "instability assumption" which, while often associated with holism, can be separated from it. The versions of holism that follow from 'interpretational' account of meaning are not committed to the instability assumption and can thus avoid many of the problems traditionally associated with holism.

I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases (...) of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your action, even though your action cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons. (shrink)

Decision-making Capacity matters to whether a patient’s decision should determine her treatment. But why it matters in this way isn’t clear. The standard story is that dmc matters because autonomy matters. And this is thought to justify dmc as a gatekeeper for autonomy – whereby autonomy concerns arise if but only if a patient has dmc. But appeals to autonomy invoke two distinct concerns: concern for authenticity – concern that a choice is consistent with an individual’s commitments; and (...) concern for sovereignty – concern that an individual exercises control over that which is hers to control. Here, I argue, neither concern can alone explain why dmc matters. Instead, dmc matters because it indicates a harmony between the two concerns – the demands of each concern are more likely to agree if a patient has dmc. This vindicates the standard story, but also makes clear that dmc is an inappropriate gatekeeper for autonomy. (shrink)

The dispute in philosophical decision theory between causalists and evidentialists remains unsettled. Many are attracted to the causal view’s endorsement of a species of dominance reasoning, and to the intuitive verdicts it gets on a range of cases with the structure of the infamous Newcomb’s Problem. But it also faces a rising wave of purported counterexamples and theoretical challenges. In this paper I will describe a novel decision theory which saves what is appealing about the causal view while (...) avoiding its most worrying objections, and which promises to generalize to solve a set of related problems in other normative domains. (shrink)

The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.

Decision-making capacity (DMC) plays an important role in clinical practice—determining, on the basis of a patient’s decisional abilities, whether they are entitled to make their own medical decisions or whether a surrogate must be secured to participate in decisions on their behalf. As a result, it’s critical that we get things right—that our conceptual framework be well-suited to the task of helping practitioners systematically sort through the relevant ethical considerations in a way that reliably and transparently delivers correct verdicts (...) about who should and should not have the authority to make their own medical decisions. Unfortunately, however, the standard approach to DMC does not get things right. It is of virtually no help in identifying and clarifying the relevant ethical considerations. And, embedded in the prevailing anti-paternalist paradigm, DMC assessments obfuscate and distort the underlying ethical justification for granting or withholding decisional authority. Here, we describe the core commitments of the standard approach to DMC and then highlight three problems with it. We then argue that these problems are significant enough that they call for more than merely tinkering and fine tuning—variations of the standard approach cannot adequately address them. Instead, we should ditch DMC. (shrink)

This paper aims to identify the decision support systems and their role on the strategic management development in the Universities- Case Study: Islamic University of Gaza. The descriptive approach was used where a questionnaire was developed and distributed to a stratified random sample. (230) questionnaires were distributed and (204) were returned with response rate (88.7%). The most important findings of the study: The presence of a statistically significant positive correlation between the decision support systems and strategic management in (...) the Islamic University in Gaza, and this shows that there is a role for decision support systems in strategic management development. The senior management is convinced of the importance of strategic management of the organization, and this conviction paid to clearly understand the process of the development of strategic management and thus led to a commitment to this process to improve its performance. There is an impact on the strategic management of the capabilities available for the use of decision support systems, and the type of decision support systems used, while there is little effect of top management support for the use of decision support systems. Also, the results showed that there were no statistically significant differences between the averages of the respondents answers attributed to personal data. The research also concluded a series of recommendations: The Islamic University of Gaza need to develop its infrastructure of decision support systems when it develops the strategic management. It should increase its interest in organizational potential through the necessity of a separate unit for decision support systems. As well as increased interest in the physical and technical capabilities available to decision support systems through continuity in keeping pace with technological means and techniques, continued support of senior management in the organization of strategic management for its positive role on decision support systems, that senior management will continue in the organization in creating a culture of strategic management, and it should encourage employees to participate in the strategic management process. (shrink)

Although Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes’s macroeconomics and essential message clashes with authoritative alternative interpretations, it has become increasingly influential during the years following the Global Financial Crisis, even in mainstream circles. This paper offers a critical evaluation of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis from the perspective of the alternative Austro-Wicksellian paradigm. Although some of the similarities and/or analogies between Minsky’s approach and that of the Austrian School suggest a more than merely superficial affinity between the two theoretical frameworks and although (...) some scope for cross-fertilization between both approaches can be found, both theoretically and empirically, at a fundamental conceptual level both theories remain incompatible and difficult if not impossible to reconcile, in particular in terms of fundamental causality and in terms of policy conclusions and prescriptions. Despite the fact that Minsky’s policy conclusions are multifaceted and somewhat eclectic, they manifest a lack of familiarity with the conclusions of the Austrian analysis of the problems of central planning by Big Players such as Big Bank and Big Government. Both approaches also offer contrasting interpretations of the historical experience of the Global Financial Crisis. (shrink)

A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major (...) obstacles to the modelling of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.

The classic formulation of causal decision theory (CDT) appeals to counterfactuals. It says that you should aim to choose an option that would have a good outcome, were you to choose it. However, this version of CDT faces trouble if the laws of nature are deterministic. After all, the standard theory of counterfactuals says that, if the laws are deterministic, then if anything—including the choice you make—were different in the present, either the laws would be violated or the distant (...) past would be changed. And as several authors have shown, it's easy to transform this upshot of the standard theory of counterfactuals into full-blown counterexamples to CDT. In response to these counterexamples, I argue here that the problem lies, not so much with CDT's guiding idea—that it's the expected causal consequences of your actions that matter for rational decision-making—but with the fact that the classic formulation of CDT doesn't pay sufficient attention to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals. I develop a contextualist version of CDT which better accounts for this context-sensitivity. And I show that my theory avoids the problems faced by the classic formulation of CDT in determinstic worlds. (shrink)

Evidential Decision Theory is flawed, but its flaws are not fully understood. David Lewis (1981) famously charged that EDT recommends an irrational policy of managing the news and “commends the ostrich as rational”. Lewis was right, but the case he appealed to—Newcomb’s Problem—does not demonstrate his conclusion. Indeed, decision theories other than EDT, such as Committal Decision Theory and Functional Decision Theory, agree with EDT's verdicts in Newcomb’s Problem, but their flaws, whatever they may be, do (...) not stem from any ostrich-like recommendations. We offer a new case which shows that EDT mismanages the news, thus vindicating Lewis’s original charge. We argue that this case reveals a flaw in the “Why ain’cha rich?” defense of EDT. We argue further that this case is an advance on extant putative counterexamples to EDT. (shrink)

Across two studies the hypotheses were tested that stressful situations affect both leadership ethical acting and leaders' recognition of ethical dilemmas. In the studies, decision makers recruited from 3 sites of a Swedish multinational civil engineering company provided personal data on stressful situations, made ethical decisions, and answered to stress-outcome questions. Stressful situations were observed to have a greater impact on ethical acting than on the recognition of ethical dilemmas. This was particularly true for situations involving punishment and lack (...) of rewards. The results are important for the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of an organization, especially with regard to the analysis of the Stressors influencing managerial work and its implications for ethical behavior. (shrink)

My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but they (...) are not new problems. They are old problems transposed into a new key. Nonetheless, decisions made with foreknowledge illustrate important lessons about the instrumental value of our choices. Once we've appreciated these lessons, we are left with a version of CDT which faces no novel threats from foreknowledge. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss how Causal Decision Theory should be modified to handle a class of problematic cases involving deterministic laws. Causal Decision Theory, as it stands, is problematically biased against your endorsing deterministic propositions (for example it tells you to deny Newtonian physics, regardless of how confident you are of its truth). Our response is that this is not a problem for Causal Decision Theory per se, but arises because of the standard method for assessing (...) the truth of certain counterfactuals. The truth of deterministic laws is `modally fragile' on the standard semantics for counterfactuals: if determinism is true and you were to do otherwise, the laws would be different. We provide two ways of avoiding this problem: 1) supplement the standard semantics for counterfactuals with impossible worlds, or 2) introduce rigid designators into the description of problematic decision situations. We argue that both of these approaches are well-motivated and can be readily incorporated into Lewisian Causal Decision Theory. (shrink)

In this study, we propose a new approach based on fuzzy TODIM (Portuguese acronym for interactive and multicriteria decision-making) for decision-making problems in uncertain environments. Our method incorporates group utility and individual regret, which are often ignored in traditional multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) methods. To enhance the analysis and application of fuzzy sets in decision-making processes, we introduce novel entropy and distance measures for q-rung picture fuzzy sets. These measures include an entropy measure based on the sine (...) function and a distance measure derived from the Jensen-Shannon divergence. In our methodology, incorporating the sine function into the entropy measure stands out as a distinctive decision, grounded in a profound understanding of the inherent characteristics of fuzzy sets. Utilizing the sine function proves especially advantageous when handling fuzzy sets that exhibit cyclical variations or fluctuations in their membership degrees. We effectively weight the criteria for an improved evaluation by using this new entropy measure. The introduced distance measure finds application in the TODIM approach, allowing the execution of TODIM method steps within a fuzzy environment until the determination of one alternative’s dominance over another—an advancement beyond traditional approaches. We apply our enhanced fuzzy TODIM method to a real-life construction project management problem from the literature and compare the results with those in the literature and obtained from other MCDM methods. Our proposed measures are robust, as demonstrated by the sensitivity analysis that varied the weights of group utility and individual regret, with the results visualized in a 3D sensitivity plot. The findings demonstrate the superiority of our method in providing a more comprehensive evaluation of alternatives, making it a useful tool for decision-makers facing complex and uncertain decision-making problems. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy. I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one. Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called “parity” (as well as (...) for cases in which agents have incomplete preferences or imprecise credences). The problem with the all of the decision theories that have been defended to account for parity is that they are committed to a claim I call unanimity: when all of the functions in the set agree that an agent ought to do A, then an agent ought to do A. A decision theory committed to unanimity violates the constraint I defend in this paper. Thus, if parity exists, a new approach to decision theory is necessary. (shrink)

We can define state instability as a situation in which a system's previously established norms and rules no longer function properly. Under the circumstances of changed institutional functioning, the main actors of the given environment resort to new strategies to preserve their authority and maintain their positions. In this paper, we aim to present rhetorical strategies as a response of political actors to the environment of state instability. We will use a qualitative content analysis method to present the (...) three political crises in the United States, Serbia, and Croatia. The paper aims to compare international rhetorical strategies as an attempt by political actors to avoid state instability. (shrink)

The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathers of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, (...) Gibbard, Harper, Lewis, Skyrms, Sobel, and Joyce) all endorse counterfactual decision theories. I additionally discuss why these theories came to be called ‘causal’, rather than ‘counterfactual’. And I argue that, properly understood, causal decision theory escapes Hedden's objections. (shrink)

Recently, bioethicists and the UNCRPD have advocated for supported medical decision-making on behalf of patients with intellectual disabilities. But what does supported decision-making really entail? One compelling framework is Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis’ mental prosthesis account, which envisions supported decision-making as a process in which trustees act as mere appendages for the patient’s will; the trustee provides the cognitive tools the patient requires to realize her conception of her own good. We argue that supported decision-making (...) would be better understood as a collaborative process, giving patients with intellectual disabilities the opportunity to make decisions in a respectful relationship with trusted others. We offer an alternative account of supported decision-making where the primary constraint is to protect the patient from domination by the trustee. This is advantageous in its preservation of the prospects for genuine collaboration, for the mental prosthesis approach ultimately reinforces a problematic ideal of isolated patient self-determination. (shrink)

The escape from the ‘Malthusian trap’ is shown to tend to generate in a rather systematic way quite serious political upheavals. Some demographic structural mechanisms that generate such upheavals have been analyzed, which has made it possible to develop a mathematical model of the respective processes. The forecast of political instability in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2015– 2050 produced on the basis of this model is presented.

Innovative research on decision making under ‘deep uncertainty’ is underway in applied fields such as engineering and operational research, largely outside the view of normative theorists grounded in decision theory. Applied methods and tools for decision support under deep uncertainty go beyond standard decision theory in the attention that they give to the structuring of decisions. Decision structuring is an important part of a broader philosophy of managing uncertainty in decision making, and normative (...) class='Hi'>decision theorists can both learn from, and contribute to, the growing deep uncertainty decision support literature. (shrink)

Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail (...) not only these definitional properties, but also the stochastic independence of the two sources of uncertainty. This goes some way towards filling a curious lacuna in Bayesian decision theory. (shrink)

Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have argued that the best way to resolve complex “moral” issues in clinical settings is to focus on the details of specific cases. This approach to medical decision-making, labeled ‘casuistry’, has met with much criticism in recent years. In response to this criticism, Carson Strong has attempted to salvage much of Jonsen’s and Toulmin’s version of casuistry. He concludes that much of their analysis, including Jonsen’s further elaboration about the casuistic methodology, is on the (...) mark. In this essay, the details of Jonsen’s and Toulmin’s version of casuistry and the major criticisms against their approach to clinical decision-making are explicated. Furthermore, it is argued that Strong’s salvage efforts fail to deflect these criticisms. The upshot of this analysis, which includes a few additional criticisms, is that Jonsen’s and Toulmin’s version of casuistry is not an appropriate framework from which to resolve complex “moral” issues in clinical settings. (shrink)

This paper is about two requirements on wish reports whose interaction motivates a novel semantics for these ascriptions. The first requirement concerns the ambiguities that arise when determiner phrases, such as definite descriptions, interact with ‘wish’. More specifically, several theorists have recently argued that attitude ascriptions featuring counterfactual attitude verbs license interpretations on which the determiner phrase is interpreted relative to the subject’s beliefs. The second requirement involves the fact that desire reports in general require decision-theoretic notions for their (...) analysis. The current study is motivated by the fact that no existing account captures both of these aspects of wishing. I develop a semantics for wish reports that makes available belief-relative readings but also allows decision-theoretic notions to play a role in shaping the truth conditions of these ascriptions. The general idea is that we can analyze wishing in terms of a two-dimensional notion of expected utility. (shrink)

Decision-making has traditionally been modelled as a serial process, consisting of a number of distinct stages. The traditional account assumes that an agent first acquires the necessary perceptual evidence, by constructing a detailed inner repre- sentation of the environment, in order to deliberate over a set of possible options. Next, the agent considers her goals and beliefs, and subsequently commits to the best possible course of action. This process then repeats once the agent has learned from the consequences of (...) her actions and subsequently updated her beliefs. Under this interpretation, the agent’s body is considered merely as a means to report the decision, or to acquire the relevant goods. However, embodied cognition argues that an agent’s body should be understood as a proper part of the decision-making pro- cess. Accepting this principle challenges a number of commonly held beliefs in the cognitive sciences, but may lead to a more unified account of decision-making. This thesis explores an embodied account of decision-making using a recent frame- work known as predictive processing. This framework has been proposed by some as a functional description of neural activity. However, if it is approached from an embodied perspective, it can also offer a novel account of decision-making that ex- tends the scope of our explanatory considerations out beyond the brain and the body. We explore work in the cognitive sciences that supports this view, and argue that decision theory can benefit from adopting an embodied and predictive perspective. (shrink)

What question are decision theorists trying to answer, and why is it worth trying to answer it? A lot of philosophers talk as if the aim of decision theory is to describe how we should make decisions, and the reason to do this is to help us make better decisions. I disagree on both fronts. The aim of the decision theory is to describe how a certain kind of idealised decider does in fact decide. And the reason (...) to do this is that this idealisation, like many other idealisations, helps generate explanations of real-world behaviour. We shouldn't do what these ideal deciders do, or try to be more like them, because a lot of what they do only makes sense because of the differences between us and them. Still, sometimes those differences are small enough that they can be ignored in explanations, and that's when decision theory is useful. (shrink)