An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism

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Abstract
I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism
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2013, 2014
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PhilPapers/Archive ID
MEGAAA
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Archival date: 2015-06-06
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2014-08-08

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