An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17 (2013)
Abstract
I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism
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Archival date: 2015-06-06
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References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.Chalmers, David J.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Kim, Jaegwon
The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration.Goldie, Peter
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility.Chalmers, David
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Loewer, Barry & Kim, Jaegwon
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Citations of this work BETA
The How and Why of Consciousness?Meese, Tim S.
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2014-08-08
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627 ( #3,966 of 41,550 )
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45 ( #13,775 of 41,550 )
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