Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-05-14
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
605 ( #10,380 of 65,616 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #14,695 of 65,616 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.