Las teorías de las emociones y su relación con la cognición: un análisis desde la filosofía de la mente

Cuadernos FHyCS 1 (49):13-38 (2016)
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Abstract

This work deals with the discussion about the characterization of the emotions that maintain the so called "cognitive current" and "perceptive current". These have been canonically conceived as incompatible ways of accounting for the same phenomenon: the basic emotions. In this paper I intend to examine the disagreement between these opposing approaches, seeking to clarify the scope of this disagreement, and to elucidate the key concepts on this discussion. The article reviews the structure that is detailed below. Each of the positions in question is presented first. To this end, both philosophy and psychology have been considered: R. Solomon and R. Lazarus (cognitive perspective) and W. James and R. Zajonc (perceptive perspective). In this section (The approaches in dispute) I will try to offer a conceptual reconstruction of each of the positions, establishing the fundamental theses of each of them, to be examined in depth in the next section (Cognition and perception) in order to show that the disagreement itself and the difficulties that emerge from it, to provide an adequate characterization of the phenomenon, that can be overcome or at least, must be reconceptualized. In this sense, I will offer two ways in which this reconceptualization can be given: in a dissolute sense, by showing that the discrepancy between the two perspectives are based on false dichotomies, turning the discussion into a terminological disagreement. Second, I will outline a mode of resolution in the proper sense along with consideration. (The meaning of "emotion": are there unconscious emotions?)

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Andrea Florencia Melamed
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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