A Defense of Privacy as Control

The Journal of Ethics 25 (3):385-402 (2021)
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Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

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Leonhard Menges
University of Salzburg


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