Immediate and Reflective Senses

In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 187-209 (2019)
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Abstract
This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate and reflective senses of thoughts and the concepts they involve, but it also applies to other mental instances of intentionality.
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First archival date: 2018-09-24
Latest version: 4 (2019-04-29)
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The Big Book of Concepts.Murphy, Gregory L.
Psychosemantics.Fodor, Jerry A.

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