Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories

Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories

Author Profiles

David Bourget
University of Western Ontario
Angela Mendelovici
University of Western Ontario

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