Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle

Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502 (2009)
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Abstract
It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties
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2009
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MENNPA
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Archival date: 2014-01-10
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2009-01-28

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