Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle

Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties
Reprint years
2009
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MENNPA
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-01-10
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Explaining the Brain.Craver, Carl F.

View all 55 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Metaphysical Causation.Wilson, Alastair
Emergent Chance.List, Christian & Pivato, Marcus

View all 88 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,015 ( #1,923 of 41,614 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
79 ( #6,472 of 41,614 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.