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  1. Denialism: What Do the so-Called Consciousness Deniers Deny?Orly Shenker - 2020 - Iyyun 68:307-337.
    Some philosophers consider that some of their colleagues deny that consciousness exists. We shall call the latter ‘deniers’, adopting a term that was initially meant pejoratively. What do the deniers deny? In order to answer this question, we shall examine arguments, both of some deniers and of their critics, and present denialism as a systematic highly non-trivial position that has had some interesting achievements. We will show that the denialist project concerns the epistemology of the mind and specifically of consciousness: (...)
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  2. The Whence and Whither of Experience.Nick Treanor - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1119-1138.
    Consider a toothache, or a feeling of intense pleasure, or the sensation you would have if you looked impassively at an expanse of colour. In each case, the experience can easily be thought to fill time by being present throughout a period. This way of thinking of conscious experience is natural enough, but it is in deep conflict with the view that physical processes are ultimately responsible for experience. The problem is that physical processes are related to durations in a (...)
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  3. Mapping the Mind: Bridge Laws and the Psycho-Neural Interface.Marco J. Nathan & Guillermo Del Pinal - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):637-657.
    Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with increasing accuracy, patterns and locations of neural activation associated with various psychological functions. These techniques have revived a longstanding debate regarding the relation between the mind and the brain: while many authors claim that neuroscientific data can be employed to advance theories of higher cognition, others defend the so-called ‘autonomy’ of psychology. Settling this significant issue requires understanding the nature of the bridge laws used at the psycho-neural interface. (...)
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  4. Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense.Alyssa Ney - 2016 - In Ken Aizawa Carl Gillett (ed.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  5. The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground.Ned Block - 2015 - In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-133.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  6. On a Priori Deduction of Physico-Physical and Psycho-Physical Identities.Francois-Igor Pris - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 6:157-182.
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  7. Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.
    It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...)
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  8. The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability.Holger Lyre - 2009 - In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos. pp. 79.
    Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR (...)
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  9. The Return of Reductive Physicalism.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - In Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    The importance of the exclusion argument for contemporary physicalism is emphasized. The recent attempts to vindicate reductive physicalism by invoking certain needed revisions to the Nagelian model of reduction are then discussed. It is argued that such revised views of reduction offer in fact much less help to reductive physicalism than is sometimes supposed, and that many of these views lead to trouble when combined with the exclusion argument.
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  10. Functionalism and Psychological Reductionism: Friends, Not Foes.Andrew Melnyk - 2006 - In Maurice Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell. pp. 31-50.
    The paper argues that a broadly functionalist picture of psychological phenomena is quite consistent with at least one interesting thesis of psychological reductionism.
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  11. Reduction Revisited.Emma Ruttkamp - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):102-112.
    This is a first tentative examination of the possibility of reinstating reduction as a valid candidate for presenting relations between mental and physical properties. Classical Nagelian reduction is undoubtedly contaminated in many ways, but here I investigate the possibility of adapting to problems concerning mental properties an alternative definition for theory reduction in philosophy of science. The definition I offer is formulated with the aid of non-monotonic logic, which I suspect might be a very interesting realm for testing notions concerning (...)
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  12. Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  13. Mental Causation: Anatomy of a Problem.Eduardo A. Rabossi - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (3):285-304.
    The origins and development of the problem of mental causation are outlined. The underlying presuppositions which give rise to the problem are identified. Possible strategies for solving, or dissolving the problem are examined.
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  14. Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance?Geert Keil - 2001 - In Thomas Schäfer, Udo Tietz & Rüdiger Zill (eds.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. pp. 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Keil geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag für das (...)
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  15. Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction.Cory Wright - 2000 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):413–436.
    "New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...)
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  16. There is No Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. London: Routledge. pp. 65.
    Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences...
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  17. Mind-Brain Reduction: New Light From Philosophy of Science.Patricia S. Churchland - 1982 - Neuroscience 7:1041-7.
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