Probabilistic causation and causal processes: A critique of Lewis
Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663 (1989)
Abstract
This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
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229 ( #25,875 of 2,439,388 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #47,467 of 2,439,388 )
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