Contents
10 found
Order:
  1. Bread prices and sea levels: why probabilistic causal models need to be monotonic.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2024 - Philosophical Studies.
    A key challenge for probabilistic causal models is to distinguish non-causal probabilistic dependencies from true causal relations. To accomplish this task, causal models are usually required to satisfy several constraints. Two prominent constraints are the causal Markov condition and the faithfulness condition. However, other constraints are also needed. One of these additional constraints is the causal sufficiency condition, which states that models must not omit any direct common causes of the variables they contain. In this paper, I argue that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Path-Specific Effects.Naftali Weinberger - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):53-76.
    A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1974]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on Pearl ([2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were they to be transmitted only via P. Facts about such effects may (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3. Causal, A Priori True, and Explanatory: A Reply to Lange and Rosenberg.Mehmet Elgin & Elliott Sober - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):167-171.
    Sober [2011] argues that some causal statements are a priori true and that a priori causal truths are central to explanations in the theory of natural selection. Lange and Rosenberg [2011] criticize Sober's argument. They concede that there are a priori causal truths, but maintain that those truths are only ‘minimally causal’. They also argue that explanations that are built around a priori causal truths are not causal explanations, properly speaking. Here we criticize both of Lange and Rosenberg's claims.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation.Luke Glynn - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.
    The starting point in the development of probabilistic analyses of token causation has usually been the naïve intuition that, in some relevant sense, a cause raises the probability of its effect. But there are well-known examples both of non-probability-raising causation and of probability-raising non-causation. Sophisticated extant probabilistic analyses treat many such cases correctly, but only at the cost of excluding the possibilities of direct non-probability-raising causation, failures of causal transitivity, action-at-a-distance, prevention, and causation by absence and omission. I show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  5. Natural-born determinists: a new defense of causation as probability-raising.Robert Northcott - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1-20.
    A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Chance-changing causal processes.Helen Beebee - 2003 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance. London: Routledge. pp. 39-57.
    Scepticism concerning the idea of causation being linked to contingent chance-raising is articulated in Beebee’s challenging chapter. She suggests that none of these approaches will avoid the consequence that spraying defoliant on a weed is a cause of the weed’s subsequent health. We will always be able to abstract away enough of the healthy plant processes so all that’s left is the causal chain involving defoliation and health. In those circumstances, there will be contingent chance-raising. Beebee’s conclusion is that we (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. The limits of causal order, from economics to physics.Nancy Cartwright - 2002 - In Uskali Mäki (ed.), Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction. Cambridge: pp. 137-151.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  8. Do causes raise the chances of effects?Helen Beebee - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):182-190.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Probabilistic causation and causal processes: A critique of Lewis.Peter Menzies - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.
    This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  10. Non-probabilistic Causation without Necessitation.Daniel Von Wachter - manuscript
    This article introduces the notion of the directedness of a process, which underlies event causation as well as the persistence of things. Using this notion it investigates what happens in typical cases of active event causation. Causes never necessitate their effects because even non- probabilistic causes can be counteracted.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark