Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone

In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 303-316 (2019)
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The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem, the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance hypothesis, the hypothesis that we are ignorant of certain key facts about mental combination, which allows the panpsychist to avoid certain objections based on the combination problem.

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Angela Mendelovici
University of Western Ontario


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