Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone

In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge (2019)
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Panpsychism, the view that microphysical entities have phenomenal experiences that constitute the phenomenal experiences of macrophysical entities, seems to be committed to various sorts of mental combination: it seems that experiences, subjects, and phenomenal characters would have to mentally combine in order to yield experiences such as our own. The combination problem for panpsychism is that of explaining precisely how the required forms of mental combination occur. This paper argues that, given a few plausible assumptions, the panpsychist’s combination problems are not different in kind from other combination problems that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of explaining how we can have experiences in new quality spaces. Understanding mental combination poses a significant challenge to understanding the mind, and it is a problem for everyone.
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Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 187-209.

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