View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

11 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2019-03-07
    Psychological Closure Does Not Entail Cognitive Closure.Michael Vlerick & Maarten Boudry - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):101-115.
    According to some philosophers, we are “cognitively closed” to the answers to certain problems. McGinn has taken the next step and offered a list of examples: the mind/body problem, the problem of the self and the problem of free will. There are naturalistic, scientific answers to these problems, he argues, but we cannot reach them because of our cognitive limitations. In this paper, we take issue with McGinn's thesis as the most well-developed and systematic one among the so-called “new mysterians”. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-03-07
    Can Evolution Get Us Off the Hook? Evaluating the Ecological Defence of Human Rationality.Maarten Boudry, Michael Vlerick & Ryan McKay - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:524-535.
    This paper discusses the ecological case for epistemic innocence: does biased cognition have evolutionary benefits, and if so, does that exculpate human reasoners from irrationality? Proponents of ‘ecological rationality’ have challenged the bleak view of human reasoning emerging from research on biases and fallacies. If we approach the human mind as an adaptive toolbox, tailored to the structure of the environment, many alleged biases and fallacies turn out to be artefacts of narrow norms and artificial set-ups. However, we argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3. added 2019-03-07
    Biological Constraints Do Not Entail Cognitive Closure.Michael Vlerick - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48:21-27.
    From the premise that our biology imposes cognitive constraints on our epistemic activities, a series of prominent authors – most notably Fodor, Chomsky and McGinn – have argued that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects and properties of the world. Cognitive constraints, they argue, entail cognitive closure. I argue that this is not the case. More precisely, I detect two unwarranted conflations at the core of arguments deriving closure from constraints. The first is a conflation of what I will (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. added 2018-01-13
    Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge.
    Panpsychism—the view that the phenomenal experiences of macrophysical items, like ourselves, are nothing over and above combinations of phenomenal experiences of microphysical items—seems to be committed to various sorts of mental combination: in order to yield experiences such as our own, it seems that experiences, subjects, and phenomenal characters would have to mentally combine to yield new experiences, new subjects, and new phenomenal characters. The combination problem for panpsychism is that of explaining precisely how the required forms of mental combination (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2017-01-18
    Consciousness All the Way Down? An Analysis of McGinn's Critique of Panexperientialism.Christian de Quincey - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):217-229.
    This paper examines two objections by Colin McGinn to panexperientialist metaphysics as a solution to the mind-body problem. It begins by briefly stating how the `ontological problem' of the mind-body relationship is central to the philosophy of mind, summarizes the difficulties with dualism and materialism, and outlines the main tenets of panexperientialism. Panexperientialists, such as David Ray Griffin, claim that theirs is one approach to solving the mind-body problem which does not get stuck in accounting for interaction nor in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. added 2017-01-14
    Review of McGinn *Ethics, Evil, and Fiction*. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1998 - The Times Literary Supplement (4946):28-29.
    I try to distinguish McGinn's separation of evil from mere wrong from his aesthetic theory of morality. I argue that the combination is dangeroous.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2016-03-16
    Against McGinn's Mysterianism.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-10.
    There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2015-04-05
    Colin McGinn, The Character of Mind. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1984 - Philosophy in Review 4 (6):278-280.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2015-04-04
    A Review Of Colin Mcginn's Mindsight. [REVIEW]Casey Woodling - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Anyone who has been around analytic philosophy the past 20 years knows that consciousness is in. These days much effort is spent playing whack-a-dualist. It seems that anyone who is anyone has written a book on the metaphysics of mind. Colin McGinn's new book marks a refreshing departure from this trend. Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning discusses the role imagination plays in the way we represent the world; the role it plays in dreams and some mental illnesses; and the fundamental role (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2014-03-21
    Minds Sans Miracles: Colin McGinn's Naturalized Mysterianism.Robert K. Garcia - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 2 (2):227-242.
    In this paper, I discuss Colin McGinn’s claim that the mind is not miraculous but merely mysterious, and that this mystery is due to the limits of our cognitive faculties. To adequately present the flow and unity of McGinn’s overall argument, I offer an extended and uninterrupted précis of his case, followed by a critique. I will argue that McGinn’s argument is unsuccessful if it is intended to persuade non-naturalists, but nevertheless may be a plausible position for a naturalist, qua (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2008-12-31
    Sir William Mitchell and the "New Mysterianism".W. Martin Davies - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):253-73.
    This paper is about the work of a long forgotten philosopher and his views which have surprising relevance to discussions in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that, far from being a traditional idealist, Mitchell advanced a very subtle position best seen as marking a transition from idealist views and later materialist accounts, the latter popularly attributed to Australian philosophers in the second half of the 20th century.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark