Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157 (2013)
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Abstract
Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects
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2014
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First archival date: 2013-03-07
Latest version: 2 (2013-03-07)
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Emotions as Attitudes.Deonna, Julien A. & Teroni, Fabrice
Intentionalism About Moods.Mendelovici, Angela

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2012-11-25

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