Sobre a acrasia em Aristóteles: sua possibilidade, a abordagem dialética e a resposta antissocrática ao problema

Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (2011)
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Abstract
I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory.
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