The emotion account of blame

Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273 (2017)
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Abstract
For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the resulting emotion account of blame
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2017
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MENTEA
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Archival date: 2017-04-27
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