Turing Test, Chinese Room Argument, Symbol Grounding Problem. Meanings in Artificial Agents (APA 2013)

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The Turing Test (TT), the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), and the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) are about the question “can machines think?” We propose to look at these approaches to Artificial Intelligence (AI) by showing that they all address the possibility for Artificial Agents (AAs) to generate meaningful information (meanings) as we humans do. The initial question about thinking machines is then reformulated into “can AAs generate meanings like humans do?” We correspondingly present the TT, the CRA and the SGP as being about generation of human-like meanings. We model and address such possibility by using the Meaning Generator System (MGS) where a system submitted to an internal constraint generates a meaning in order to satisfy the constraint. The system approach of the MGS allows comparing meaning generations in animals, humans and AAs. The comparison shows that in order to have AAs capable of generating human-like meanings, we need the AAs to carry human constraints. And transferring human constraints to AAs raises concerns coming from the unknown natures of life and human mind which are at the root of human constraints. Implications for the TT, the CRA and the SGP are highlighted. It is shown that designing AAs capable of thinking like humans needs an understanding about the natures of life and human mind that we do not have today. Following an evolutionary approach, we propose as a first entry point an investigation about the possibility for extending a “stay alive” constraint into AAs. Ethical concerns are raised from the relations between human constraints and human values. Continuations are proposed. (This paper is an extended version of the proceedings of an AISB/IACAP 2012 presentation)
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First archival date: 2012-10-17
Latest version: 1 (2013-10-20)
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