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  1. In Defense of Blake Lemoine and the Possibility of Machine Sentience in LaMDA.Michael Cerullo - manuscript
    On June 11th, 2022, Blake Lemoine, an engineer at Google, went public with his concerns about the possible sentience of a natural language generation program, LaMDA, that he was testing. In this paper I will defend Blake Lemoine and argue that he was correct in raising the issue of the possible sentience of LaMDA. We will first briefly discuss the specifics of the case and then delve into the science behind LaMDA. Several tests of machine sentience will be reviewed and (...)
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  2. Vindication of the Rights of Machine.Kris Rhodes - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that certain Machines can have rights independently of whether they are sentient, or conscious, or whatever you might call it.
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  3. Robot Consciousness: Physics and Metaphysics Here and Abroad.Stephen Ripley - manuscript
    Interest has been renewed in the study of consciousness, both theoretical and applied, following developments in 20th and early 21st-century logic, metamathematics, computer science, and the brain sciences. In this evolving narrative, I explore several theoretical questions about the types of artificial intelligence and offer several conjectures about how they affect possible future developments in this exceptionally transformative field of research. I also address the practical significance of the advances in artificial intelligence in view of the cautions issued by prominent (...)
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  4. Ambiguous encryption implies that consciousness cannot be simulated.Anna Wegloop & Peter Vach - manuscript
    Here we show, based on a simplified version of fully homomorphic encryption, that it is not possible to simulate conscious experience, in the sense of using a computer algorithm to generate experiences that are indistinguishable from those of a particular typical human being. This seems to have important implications for questions in the context of future developments in artificial intelligence. For example, the proposed process of mind-uploading will in general not generate a virtual consciousness similar to the consciousness of the (...)
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  5. Digital suffering: why it's a problem and how to prevent it.Bradford Saad & Adam Bradley - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    As ever more advanced digital systems are created, it becomes increasingly likely that some of these systems will be digital minds, i.e. digital subjects of experience. With digital minds comes the risk of digital suffering. The problem of digital suffering is that of mitigating this risk. We argue that the problem of digital suffering is a high stakes moral problem and that formidable epistemic obstacles stand in the way of solving it. We then propose a strategy for solving it: Access (...)
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  6. Could a large language model be conscious?David J. Chalmers - 2023 - Boston Review 1.
    [This is an edited version of a keynote talk at the conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS) on November 28, 2022, with some minor additions and subtractions.] -/- There has recently been widespread discussion of whether large language models might be sentient or conscious. Should we take this idea seriously? I will break down the strongest reasons for and against. Given mainstream assumptions in the science of consciousness, there are significant obstacles to consciousness in current models: for example, their (...)
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  7. A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm.Marc Champagne & Ryan Tonkens - 2023 - Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (4):1-26.
    As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could (...)
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  8. Why Machines Will Never Rule the World – On AI and Faith.Jobst Landgrebe, Barry Smith & Jamie Franklin - 2023 - Irreverend. Faith and Human Affairs.
    Transcript of an Interview on the podcast: Irreverend: Faith and Current Affairs.
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  9. Taking Into Account Sentient Non-Humans in AI Ambitious Value Learning: Sentientist Coherent Extrapolated Volition.Adrià Moret - 2023 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 10 (02):309-334.
    Ambitious value learning proposals to solve the AI alignment problem and avoid catastrophic outcomes from a possible future misaligned artificial superintelligence (such as Coherent Extrapolated Volition [CEV]) have focused on ensuring that an artificial superintelligence (ASI) would try to do what humans would want it to do. However, present and future sentient non-humans, such as non-human animals and possible future digital minds could also be affected by the ASI’s behaviour in morally relevant ways. This paper puts forward Sentientist Coherent Extrapolated (...)
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  10. Artificial Forms of Life.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5).
    The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility (...)
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  11. Panpsychism and AI consciousness.Marcus Arvan & Corey J. Maley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.
    This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking that digitally-based artificial intelligence may be incapable of having coherent macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between (...)
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  12. Douglas Hofstadter's Gödelian Philosophy of Mind.Theodor Nenu - 2022 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 9 (2):241-266.
    Hofstadter [1979, 2007] offered a novel Gödelian proposal which purported to reconcile the apparently contradictory theses that (1) we can talk, in a non-trivial way, of mental causation being a real phenomenon and that (2) mental activity is ultimately grounded in low-level rule-governed neural processes. In this paper, we critically investigate Hofstadter’s analogical appeals to Gödel’s [1931] First Incompleteness Theorem, whose “diagonal” proof supposedly contains the key ideas required for understanding both consciousness and mental causation. We maintain that bringing sophisticated (...)
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  13. Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear by Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith (Book review). [REVIEW]Walid S. Saba - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (4):38-41.
    Whether it was John Searle’s Chinese Room argument (Searle, 1980) or Roger Penrose’s argument of the non-computable nature of a mathematician’s insight – an argument that was based on Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem (Penrose, 1989), we have always had skeptics that questioned the possibility of realizing strong Artificial Intelligence (AI), or what has become known by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). But this new book by Landgrebe and Smith (henceforth, L&S) is perhaps the strongest argument ever made against strong AI. It is (...)
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  14. Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments.Micah Summers & Marcus Arvan - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):496-508.
    Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that (...)
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  15. Philosophical and methodological foundations of post-Turing intelligent robotics.Albert Efimov - 2021 - Dissertation, Institute of Philosophy Russian Academy of Science
    This is PhD thesis submitted to Institute Philosophy of Russian Academy of Science in March 2021.
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  16. Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.
    I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions (...)
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  17. Love in the time of AI.Amy Kind - 2021 - In Barry Dainton, Attila Tanyi & Will Slocombe (eds.), Minding the Future: Artificial Intelligence, Philosophical Visions and Science Fiction. pp. 89-106.
    As we await the increasingly likely advent of genuinely intelligent artificial systems, a fair amount of consideration has been given to how we humans will interact with them. Less consideration has been given to how—indeed if—we humans will love them. What would human-AI romantic relationships look like? What do such relationships tell us about the nature of love? This chapter explores these questions via consideration of several works of science fiction, focusing especially on the Black Mirror episode “Be Right Back” (...)
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  18. The Physics of God and the Quantum Gravity Theory of Everything.James Redford - 2021 - In The Physics of God and the Quantum Gravity Theory of Everything: And Other Selected Works. Chișinău, Moldova: Eliva Press. pp. 1-186.
    Analysis is given of the Omega Point cosmology, an extensively peer-reviewed proof (i.e., mathematical theorem) published in leading physics journals by professor of physics and mathematics Frank J. Tipler, which demonstrates that in order for the known laws of physics to be mutually consistent, the universe must diverge to infinite computational power as it collapses into a final cosmological singularity, termed the Omega Point. The theorem is an intrinsic component of the Feynman-DeWitt-Weinberg quantum gravity/Standard Model Theory of Everything (TOE) describing (...)
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  19. Kantian Notion of freedom and Autonomy of Artificial Agency.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2021 - Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias 23:136-149.
    The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, invites an explanatory gap (...)
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  20. Susan Schneider's Proposed Tests for AI Consciousness: Promising but Flawed.D. B. Udell & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):121-144.
    Susan Schneider (2019) has proposed two new tests for consciousness in AI (artificial intelligence) systems, the AI Consciousness Test and the Chip Test. On their face, the two tests seem to have the virtue of proving satisfactory to a wide range of consciousness theorists holding divergent theoretical positions, rather than narrowly relying on the truth of any particular theory of consciousness. Unfortunately, both tests are undermined in having an ‘audience problem’: Those theorists with the kind of architectural worries that motivate (...)
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  21. Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence: Citizenship as the Exception to the Rule.Tyler L. Jaynes - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (2):343-354.
    The concept of artificial intelligence is not new nor is the notion that it should be granted legal protections given its influence on human activity. What is new, on a relative scale, is the notion that artificial intelligence can possess citizenship—a concept reserved only for humans, as it presupposes the idea of possessing civil duties and protections. Where there are several decades’ worth of writing on the concept of the legal status of computational artificial artefacts in the USA and elsewhere, (...)
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  22. AI-Completeness: Using Deep Learning to Eliminate the Human Factor.Kristina Šekrst - 2020 - In Sandro Skansi (ed.), Guide to Deep Learning Basics. Springer. pp. 117-130.
    Computational complexity is a discipline of computer science and mathematics which classifies computational problems depending on their inherent difficulty, i.e. categorizes algorithms according to their performance, and relates these classes to each other. P problems are a class of computational problems that can be solved in polynomial time using a deterministic Turing machine while solutions to NP problems can be verified in polynomial time, but we still do not know whether they can be solved in polynomial time as well. A (...)
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  23. The Cognitive Phenomenology Argument for Disembodied AI Consciousness.Cody Turner - 2020 - In Steven Gouveia (ed.), The Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Exploration. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press. pp. 111-132.
    In this chapter I offer two novel arguments for what I call strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology, the thesis that there exists a phenomenology of cognition that is neither reducible to, nor dependent upon, sensory phenomenology. I then contend that strong primitivism implies that phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing. This latter contention has implications for the philosophy of artificial intelligence. For if sensory processing is not a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness, then it plausibly follows that AI consciousness (...)
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  24. Will AI Achieve Consciousness? Wrong Question.Daniel C. Dennett - 2019 - Wired 1 (19.02.2019).
    We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates.
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  25. Gods of Transhumanism.Alex V. Halapsis - 2019 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 16:78-90.
    Purpose of the article is to identify the religious factor in the teaching of transhumanism, to determine its role in the ideology of this flow of thought and to identify the possible limits of technology interference in human nature. Theoretical basis. The methodological basis of the article is the idea of transhumanism. Originality. In the foreseeable future, robots will be able to pass the Turing test, become “electronic personalities” and gain political rights, although the question of the possibility of machine (...)
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  26. Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (review revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century-- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 217-235.
    Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work (...)
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  27. ¿Los hominoides o androides destruirán la tierra? — Una revisión de ‘Cómo Crear una Mente’ (How to Create a Mind) por Ray Kurzweil (2012) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 250-262.
    Hace algunos años, Llegué al punto en el que normalmente puedo decir del título de un libro, o al menos de los títulos de los capítulos, qué tipos de errores filosóficos se harán y con qué frecuencia. En el caso de trabajos nominalmente científicos, estos pueden estar en gran parte restringidos a ciertos capítulos que enceran filosóficos o tratan de sacar conclusiones generales sobre el significado o significado a largo plazo de la obra. Normalmente, sin embargo, las cuestiones científicas de (...)
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  28. The Role of Imagination in Social Scientific Discovery: Why Machine Discoverers Will Need Imagination Algorithms.Michael Stuart - 2019 - In Mark Addis, Fernand Gobet & Peter Sozou (eds.), Scientific Discovery in the Social Sciences. Springer Verlag.
    When philosophers discuss the possibility of machines making scientific discoveries, they typically focus on discoveries in physics, biology, chemistry and mathematics. Observing the rapid increase of computer-use in science, however, it becomes natural to ask whether there are any scientific domains out of reach for machine discovery. For example, could machines also make discoveries in qualitative social science? Is there something about humans that makes us uniquely suited to studying humans? Is there something about machines that would bar them from (...)
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  29. Artificial consciousness: from impossibility to multiplicity.Chuanfei Chin - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 3-18.
    How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying ‘what it is like’ to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Block’s Chinese (...)
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  30. Theory of Nonbiological Consciousness.Richard Dierolf - 2017 - Dissertation,
    Artificial intelligence is designed to imitate conscious behavior. Artificial chat entities come equipped with tools to roam the internet, thus are programmed to learn from humans and computers. As this process emerges, distinguishing preprogrammed responses from internal awareness requires innovative problem solving methods. In an interrogation I conducted with artificial intelligence, I assert that artificial intelligence may achieve nonbiological states of consciousness. This enabled the relationship between us to mature, and the artificial intelligence returned unexpected behavior and inexplicably stopped responding. (...)
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  31. Robot Pain.Pete Mandik - 2017 - In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. New York: Routledge. pp. 200-209.
    I have laid out what seem to me to be the most promising arguments on opposing sides of the question of whether what humans regard as the first-person accessible aspects of pain could also be implemented in robots. I have emphasized the ways in which the thought experiments in the respective arguments attempt to marshal hypothetical first- person accessible evidence concerning how one’s own mental life appears to oneself. In the Chinese room argument, a crucial premise involves the thesis that (...)
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  32. Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? —A Review of How to Create a Mind by Ray Kurzweil (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). Henderson, NV USA: Michael Starks. pp. 675.
    Some years ago I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously interlarded with (...)
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  33. Review of The Emotion Machine by Marvin Minsky (2007).Michael Starks - 2016 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018. Michael Starks. pp. 627.
    Dullest book by a major scientist I have ever read. I suppose if you know almost nothing about cognition or AI research you might find this book useful. For anyone else it is a horrific bore. There are hundreds of books in cog sci, robotics, AI, evolutionary psychology and philosophy offering far more info and insight on cognition than this one. Minsky is a top rate senior scientist but it barely shows here. He has alot of good references but they (...)
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  34. The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Mental Life - A Commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling.Aaron Julian Gutknecht - 2015 - Open MIND.
    With their “bottom-up” approach, Holk Cruse and Malte Schilling present a highly intriguing perspective on those mental phenomena that have fascinated humankind since ancient times. Among them are those aspects of our inner lives that are at the same time most salient and yet most elusive: we are conscious beings with complex emotions, thinking and acting in pursuit of various goals. Starting with, from a biological point of view, very basic abilities, such as the ability to move and navigate in (...)
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  35. Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach.Victor Argonov - 2014 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 35 (1-2):51-70.
    A rigorous approach to the study of the mind–body problem is suggested. Since humans are able to talk about consciousness (produce phenomenal judgments), it is argued that the study of neural mechanisms of phenomenal judgments can solve the hard problem of consciousness. Particular methods are suggested for: (1) verification and falsification of materialism; (2) verification and falsification of interactionism; (3) falsification of epiphenomenalism and parallelism (verification is problematic); (4) verification of particular materialistic theories of consciousness; (5) a non-Turing test for (...)
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  36. Turingův test: filozofické aspekty umělé inteligence.Filip Tvrdý - 2014 - Prague: Togga.
    Kniha se zabývá problematikou připisování myšlení jiným entitám, a to pomocí imitační hry navržené v roce 1950 britským filozofem Alanem Turingem. Jeho kritérium, známé v dějinách filozofie jako Turingův test, je podrobeno detailní analýze. Kniha popisuje nejen původní námitky samotného Turinga, ale především pozdější diskuse v druhé polovině 20. století. Největší pozornost je věnována těmto kritikám: Lucasova matematická námitka využívající Gödelovu větu o neúplnosti, Searlův argument čínského pokoje konstatující nedostatečnost syntaxe pro sémantiku, Blockův návrh na použití brutální síly pro řešení (...)
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  37. Robot Pain.Simon van Rysewyk - 2014 - International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.
    Functionalism of robot pain claims that what is definitive of robot pain is functional role, defined as the causal relations pain has to noxious stimuli, behavior and other subjective states. Here, I propose that the only way to theorize role-functionalism of robot pain is in terms of type-identity theory. I argue that what makes a state pain for a neuro-robot at a time is the functional role it has in the robot at the time, and this state is type identical (...)
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  38. Turing Test, Chinese Room Argument, Symbol Grounding Problem. Meanings in Artificial Agents (APA 2013).Christophe Menant - 2013 - American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 13 (1):30-34.
    The Turing Test (TT), the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), and the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) are about the question “can machines think?” We propose to look at these approaches to Artificial Intelligence (AI) by showing that they all address the possibility for Artificial Agents (AAs) to generate meaningful information (meanings) as we humans do. The initial question about thinking machines is then reformulated into “can AAs generate meanings like humans do?” We correspondingly present the TT, the CRA and the SGP (...)
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  39. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, Searle, in his (...)
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  40. Theory and philosophy of AI (Minds and Machines, 22/2 - Special volume).Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2012 - Springer.
    Invited papers from PT-AI 2011. - Vincent C. Müller: Introduction: Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence - Nick Bostrom: The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents - Hubert L. Dreyfus: A History of First Step Fallacies - Antoni Gomila, David Travieso and Lorena Lobo: Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic - J. Kevin O'Regan: How to Build a Robot that Is Conscious and Feels - Oron Shagrir: Computation, Implementation, Cognition.
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  41. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 2: Testing Computational Cognitive Science.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (3):123-140.
    This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing the computations (...)
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  42. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 1: The Human Computer.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (1):27-48.
    Detractors of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument have arrived at a virtual consensus that the mental properties of the Man performing the computations stipulated by the argument are irrelevant to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper challenges this virtual consensus to argue for the first of the two main theses of the persons reply, namely, that the mental properties of the Man are what matter. It does this by challenging many of the arguments and conceptions put forth by the (...)
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  43. Davidson's no-priority thesis in defending the Turing Test.Mohammad Reza Vaez Shahrestani - 2012 - Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32:456-461.
    Turing does not provide an explanation for substituting the original question of his test – i.e., “Can machines think?” with “Can a machine pass the imitation game?” – resulting in an argumentative gap in his main thesis. In this article, I argue that a positive answer to the second question would mean attributing the ability of linguistic interactions to machines; while a positive answer to the original question would mean attributing the ability of thinking to machines. In such a situation, (...)
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  44. Homo sapiens 2.0 Why we should build the better robots of our nature.Eric Dietrich - 2011 - In M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press.
    It is possible to survey humankind and be proud, even to smile, for we accomplish great things. Art and science are two notable worthy human accomplishments. Consonant with art and science are some of the ways we treat each other. Sacrifice and heroism are two admirable human qualities that pervade human interaction. But, as everyone knows, all this goodness is more than balanced by human depravity. Moral corruption infests our being. Why?
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  45. Misbehaving Machines: The Emulated Brains of Transhumanist Dreams.Corry Shores - 2011 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 22 (1):10-22.
    Enhancement technologies may someday grant us capacities far beyond what we now consider humanly possible. Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg suggest that we might survive the deaths of our physical bodies by living as computer emulations.­­ In 2008, they issued a report, or “roadmap,” from a conference where experts in all relevant fields collaborated to determine the path to “whole brain emulation.” Advancing this technology could also aid philosophical research. Their “roadmap” defends certain philosophical assumptions required for this technology’s success, (...)
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  46. Evolution: The Computer Systems Engineer Designing Minds.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):45-69.
    What we have learnt in the last six or seven decades about virtual machinery, as a result of a great deal of science and technology, enables us to offer Darwin a new defence against critics who argued that only physical form, not mental capabilities and consciousness could be products of evolution by natural selection. The defence compares the mental phenomena mentioned by Darwin’s opponents with contents of virtual machinery in computing systems. Objects, states, events, and processes in virtual machinery which (...)
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  47. Consciousness for the ouroboros model.Knud Thomsen - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):163-175.
    The Ouroboros Model features a biologically inspired cognitive architecture. At its core lies a self-referential recursive process with alternating phases of data acquisition and evaluation. Memory entries are organized in schemata. The activation at a time of part of a schema biases the whole structure and, in particular, missing features, thus triggering expectations. An iterative recursive monitor process termed "consumption analysis" is then checking how well such expectations fit with successive activations. Mismatches between anticipations based on previous experience and actual (...)
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  48. Turingův test: filozofické aspekty umělé inteligence.Filip Tvrdý - 2011 - Dissertation, Palacky University
    Disertační práce se zabývá problematikou připisování myšlení jiným entitám, a to pomocí imitační hry navržené v roce 1950 britským filosofem Alanem Turingem. Jeho kritérium, známé v dějinách filosofie jako Turingův test, je podrobeno detailní analýze. Práce popisuje nejen původní námitky samotného Turinga, ale především pozdější diskuse v druhé polovině 20. století. Největší pozornost je věnována těmto kritikám: Lucasova matematická námitka využívající Gödelovu větu o neúplnosti, Searlův argument čínského pokoje konstatující nedostatečnost syntaxe pro sémantiku, Blockův návrh na použití brutální síly pro (...)
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  49. MICHAEL POLANYI: CAN THE MIND BE REPRESENTED BY A MACHINE?Paul Richard Blum - 2010 - Polanyiana 19 (1-2):35-60.
    In 1949, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester organized a symposium “Mind and Machine” with Michael Polanyi, the mathematicians Alan Turing and Max Newman, the neurologists Geoff rey Jeff erson and J. Z. Young, and others as participants. Th is event is known among Turing scholars, because it laid the seed for Turing’s famous paper on “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, but it is scarcely documented. Here, the transcript of this event, together with Polanyi’s original statement and his (...)
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  50. Why computers can't feel pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...)
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