A Temporal Knowledge Argument

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There appears to be a temporal analogue to the Knowledge argument. If correct, it could be read as an argument that B-theorism is false: time is not completely described by McTaggart's B-series. We analyse the temporal knowledge argument in terms of Chalmers's 2-dimensional semantics. An adaptation of the most popular response to the Knowledge argument indicates that McTaggart's A-series and B-series have different modes of presentation.
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Archival date: 2018-04-24
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