Existence and the big bang

Abstract

We give an apparently new possible explanation for why there might be something rather than nothing—the weakest assumptions coupled with a kind of perspectivalism. Within a Fragmentalist interpretation of quantum mechanics (each quantum mechanics system forms a fragment), McTaggart’s A-series of time has this kind of perspectivalism. We then use the A-series and the B-series to differentiate between how far in the past the big bang was vs. how much earlier than now the big bang was. In one example model, the former goes to infinity while the latter stays finite. This implies the number of quantum interactions per unit 4-volume goes up to infinity as we approach the big bang from the present epoch.

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2021-08-18

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