Reply to Gallagher: Different conceptions of embodiment

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the context of an attempt to find the_ minimal _ set of ontological assumptions one has to make relative to a set of explanatory goals and relative to a specific data set in a certain domain. This parsimonious spirit is also the <blockquote> PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ </blockquote> spirit of SMT, which can be seen as a search for the minimal conditions under which a phenomenal self and a consciously experienced first-person perspective can emerge
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
METRTG-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2012-10-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Minimal Self-Models and the Free Energy Principle.Limanowski, Jakub & Blankenburg, Felix

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,300 ( #1,369 of 42,366 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
71 ( #8,012 of 42,366 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.