Daylight savings: What an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Significant variations in the way objects appear across different viewing conditions poses a challenge to our ability to communicate univocally about their colors. Doing so would seem to require that we break the symmetry between multiple appearances in favor of a single variant for reporting purposes. A wide range of philosophical and non-philosophical writers have held that the symmetry can be broken by appealing to daylight viewing conditions — that the appearances of objects in daylight have a stronger, and perhaps unique, claim to reveal their true colors. In this note we argue that, whatever else its merits, this appeal to daylight is not a satisfactory answer to the problem posed by perceptual variation.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-03-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
36 ( #42,992 of 47,313 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #22,116 of 47,313 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.