Full-Blooded Conceptual Realism as a Response to Skeptical Relativism
Stance 14:52-66 (2021)
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some aspect, then objective knowledge is possible, regardless of how these concepts arose historically.Author's Profile
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2021-08-31
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2021-08-31
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53 (#68,522)
6 months
43 (#30,270)
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