Skepticism

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
Related

Contents
755 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 755
Material to categorize
  1. Conceptual Engineering Between Representational Skepticism and Complacency: Is There a Third Way?Delia Belleri - 2023 - Topoi 42 (4):1051-1062.
    Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to a position called “representational skepticism”, described as one’s refusal to uncritically take over the conceptual representations one is handed. This position is contrasted with an uncritical attitude, called “representational complacency”. Arguably, neither position, or a hybrid of the two, is rationally sustainable. This paper therefore proposes an alternative option, called “critical concept conservatism”, stating that having a concept makes it rational (in a suitable sense of “rational”) for one to retain it, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Beyond Hellenistic Epistemology: Arcesilaus and the Destruction of Stoic Metaphysics, written by Charles E. Snyder.Tyler Wark - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-6.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Fragments: Poems and Narratives.Edward A. Francisco - 2022 - Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press.
    Fragments is a verse and narrative work of phenomenological and existential ontology focusing on mind-world unity and mind-world dislocation in the experience of self through time. Pivotal experiential and historical moments -- moments when normative guardrails and unreflective models of the world may be compromised -- are approached as fundamental markers of how we transact with evolving versions of ourselves and world.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter.James L. D. Brown - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic’s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Why you should be a religious skeptic.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - Philosophical Forum.
    Most philosophers of religion subscribe to some variety of religious realism: they believe that religious statements aim at capturing a mind-independent reality and are true precisely if they successfully do so. Curiously, most religious realists also believe that at least some of our religious beliefs are rationally justified. In this paper, I argue that these positions are actually at odds with each other. Religious realists should rather be religious skeptics. I first argue that realism always implies the possibility of our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview (Part II).Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:e12946.
    Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview (Part I).Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. A Note on Logical Paradoxes and Aristotelian Square of Opposition.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Epistemic Significance of Social Pressure.Hrishikesh Joshi - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):396-410.
    This paper argues for the existence of a certain type of defeater for one’s belief that P—the presence of social incentives not to share evidence against P. Such pressure makes it relatively likely that there is unpossessed evidence that would provide defeaters for P because it makes it likely that the evidence we have is a lopsided subset. This offers, I suggest, a rational reconstruction of a core strand of argument in Mill’s On Liberty. A consequence of the argument is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Skepticism Revisited: Chalmers on The Matrix and brains-in-vats.Richard Hanley - 2017 - Cognitive Systems Research 41 (March 2017):93-98.
    Thought experiments involving The Matrix, brains-in-vats, or Cartesian demons have traditionally thought to describe skeptical possibilities. Chalmers has denied this, claiming that the simulations involved are real enough to at least sometimes defeat the skeptic. Through an examination of the meaning of kind terms in natural language I argue that, though the Chalmers view may be otherwise attractive, it is not an antidote to skepticism.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Varieties of Grounding Skepticism.David Mark Kovacs - 2023 - The Monist 106 (3):301-316.
    Skepticism about grounding is the view that ground-theoretic concepts shouldn’t be used in meta­physical theorizing. Possible reasons for adopting this attitude are numerous: perhaps grounding is unintelligible; or perhaps it’s never instantiated; or perhaps it’s just too heterogeneous to be theor­­­­­etically useful. Unfortunately, as currently pursued the debate between grounding enthusiasts and skeptics is insufficiently structured. This paper’s purpose is to impose a measure of conceptual rigor on the debate by offering an opinionated taxonomy of views with a reasonable claim (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Threat of Solipsism: Wittgenstein and Cavell on Meaning, Skepticism, and Finitude Jonadas Techio, De Gruyter 2021. [REVIEW]Guido Tana - 2023 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 26 (1):160-169.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-30.
    The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificitya respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation by Nathan I. Sasser. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - Journal of Scottish Philosophy.
    Nathan Sasser's ‘purely practical reading of Hume’s response to skepticism’ is so natural and compelling that it is almost surprising that his new monograph, Hume and the Demands of Philosophy, offers its first systematic defence. I praise the book's clarity and concision, and then raise concerns about omitted topics, especially concerning Hume's views on the practical value of sceptical philosophy.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Responding to How Things Seem: Bergmann on Scepticism and Intuition.Jennifer Nagel - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):697-707.
    Michael Bergmann’s important new book on scepticism is attractively systematic and thorough. He places familiar ideas under an exceptionally bright spotlight, e.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. The Problems of Scepticism.Jasper Doomen - 2007 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy/Philosophiegeschichte Und Logische Analyse 10.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Hume's Skeptical Philosophy and the Moderation of Pride.Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan.Kok Yong Lee - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):459-478.
    To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Hume’s Constitutivist Response to Scepticism.Taro Okamura - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychological description can provide a principled reason to overcome his scepticism. In this paper, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - forthcoming - Ergo.
    The Preface Paradox is often discussed for its implications for rational belief. Much less discussed is a variant of the Preface Paradox for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the most plausible closure-friendly resolution to the Preface Paradox for Knowledge is to say that in any given context, we do not know much. I call this view ``Socraticism". -/- I argue that Socraticism is the most plausible view on two accounts -- (1). this view is compatible with the claim (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Omega Knowledge Matters.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    You omega know something when you know it, and know that you know it, and know that you know that you know it, and so on. This paper first argues that omega knowledge matters, in the sense that it is required for rational assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. The paper argues that existing accounts of omega knowledge face major challenges. One account is skeptical, claiming that we have no omega knowledge of any ordinary claims about the world. Another account embraces (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Conspiracy Theories, Scepticism, and Non-Liberal Politics.Fred Matthews - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (5):626-636.
    There has been much interest in conspiracy theories (CTs) amongst philosophers in recent years. The aim of this paper will be to apply some of the philosophical research to issues in political theory. I will first provide an overview of some of the philosophical discussions about CTs. While acknowledging that particularism is currently the dominant position in the literature, I will contend that the ‘undue scepticism problem’, a modified version of an argument put forward by Brian Keeley, is an important (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Omega Knowledge: What it is and Why it Matters.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    You omega know p when you possess every iteration of knowledge of p. This book argues that omega knowledge plays a central role in philosophy. In particular, the book argues that omega knowledge is necessary for permissible assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. Although omega knowledge plays this important role, existing theories of omega knowledge are unsatisfying. One theory, KK, identifies knowledge with omega knowledge. This theory struggles to accommodate cases of inexact knowledge. The other main theory is skeptical, claiming that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Re-Visiting the Meaning of ‘ẓann’ in the Qurʾān.Abdulla Galadari - 2022 - The Muslim World 112 (4):436-456.
    The Qurʾānic term, ‘ẓann,’ is usually understood and translated as conjecture. However, I argue that the Qurʾān uses ‘ẓann’ to mean dogmatic zeal or, in other words, being zealous to a certain belief. For conjecture, the Qurʾān uses the root ‘ḥ-s-b,’ such as, ‘ayaḥsabu.’ Although the Qurʾān may criticize some people's conjectures, it does not criticize the act of formulating opinions with the root ‘ḥ-s-b.’ However, the Qurʾān does criticize the act of ‘ẓann.’ This further emphasizes the distinction between conjecture (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. The Simulation Hypothesis, Social Knowledge, and a Meaningful Life.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    (Draft of Feb 2023, see upcoming issue for Chalmers' reply) In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Chalmers views these claims as at least weakly connected: The former claim helps forestall a concern that if objects in the simulation are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Haptic Reductions: A Sceptic’s Guide for Responding to the Touch of Crisis.Rachel Aumiller - 2022 - In The Case For Reduction. Berlin: Cultural Inquiry. pp. 39-61.
    This chapter identifies two contrasting methodological reductions utilized in philosophical scepticism: withdrawal/doubt [R–]; immersion/attention [R+]. Moving toward a feminist ethics grounded in phenomenological scepticism, Aumiller explores how reduction relates to experiences of personal and global uncertainty such as a pandemic. Reduction involves our entire embodied being, challenging how we are fundamentally in touch with the world. How we respond to being disrupted makes all the difference.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Dialogues concerning Natural Politics: A Modern Philosophical Dialogue about Policymaker Ignorance.Scott Scheall - 2023 - Substack.
    How should we conceive of policymakers for the purposes of political analysis? In particular, if we wish to explain and predict political decisions and their consequences, if we wish to ensure that political action is as effective as it can be, how should we think of policymakers? Should we think of them as they are commonly conceived in traditional political analysis, i.e., as uniquely knowledgeable and as either altruistic (i.e., as motivated to realize goals associated with their constituents’ interests) or (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Some Reluctant Skepticism about Rational Insight.Tomas Bogardus & Michael Burton - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-17.
    There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Spontaneity as a Concept of General Significance: The Austrian School on Money and Economic Order.Scott Scheall - forthcoming - In Joseph Tinguely (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Money. London: Palgrave.
    I examine the history of the concept of spontaneity in philosophy and the social sciences, particularly as it relates to monetary phenomena. I then offer an argument for the general significance of spontaneity. The essay concludes that scholars across the humanities and social sciences, whatever their (disciplinary, political, ideological, etc.) persuasion, would be well-served to further develop the theory of spontaneity and its social effects.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Practising "Dissentient Philosophical Counselling" Underpinned by African Conversationalism and Pyrrhonian Scepticism: Provisional Theory and Practice.Jaco Louw - 2022 - Stellenbosch Socratic Journal 2 (1):63-76.
    Method in philosophical counselling is still a contentious topic. That is, there is no consensus on whether the philosophical counsellor should have a method in her practice to help the counsellee resolve philosophical problems. Some philosophical counsellors claim that there should not be any rigid adherence to method(s) as this will render philosophy too dogmatic. Philosophical counselling, in light of this view, promotes a kind of mutual philosophising sans definite goal with the counsellee. What I call "dissentient philosophical counselling" takes (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Epistemologia (o della Conoscenza).Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Tiziana Andina & Gregorio Fracchia (eds.), Filosofia Contemporanea. Roma: Carocci.
    L’epistemologia (detta anche filosofia della conoscenza o gnoseologia) è la disciplina filosofica che studia come gli esseri umani si rapportano da un punto di vista cognitivo alla realtà che li circonda. Le questioni fondamentali che la interessano sono principalmente di natura normativa. Riguardano il modo in cui dovremmo regolare le nostre credenze alla luce dell’informazione in nostro possesso, e la natura della conoscenza umana ed i suoi limiti. Questo capitolo è organizzato in modo corrispondente. La prima sezione tratta della nozione (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Epistemic Sanity or Why You Shouldn't be Opinionated or Skeptical.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2022 - Episteme 20 (3):647-666.
    I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the ‘alethic potential’ of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve, given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Two challenges for 'no-norms' theism.James Reilly - 2022 - Religious Studies 1 (1):1-8.
    A number of theistic philosophers have recently denied that God is subject to moral and rational norms. At the same time, many theists employ epistemological and inductive arguments for the existence of God. I will argue that ‘no-norms’ theists cannot make use of such arguments: if God is not subject to norms – particularly rational norms – then we can say nothing substantive about what kind of worlds God would be likely to create, and as such, we cannot predict the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. On Scepticism About Personal Identity Thought Experiments.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Caroline West & Wen Yu - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity, and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods of experimental philosophy, we investigate whether (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Is There a Problem of Demarcation for Hinges?Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):317-330.
    Hinge epistemology is sometimes taken to be exempt from many of the issues bedevilling regular epistemology because of its pre-epistemic status. That is, hinges are taken to operate beyond epistemic evaluation. In this paper, I go through different non-epistemicist interpretations of what hinge epistemology is and in what sense hinges may precede epistemic evaluation. I argue that all these non-epistemicist accounts nevertheless have to deal with a certain extent of epistemic evaluation, namely, a form of the historical problem of demarcation (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The memory skepticism solution to the surprise exam paradox.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Will a surprise exam happen in the next school week? The memory skepticism solution says, “The students should expect a rational student on the penultimate evening of that week to open themselves up to the possibility that the exam may have happened already, rather than predicting that the exam will happen tomorrow.”.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Let's Not Do Responsibility Skepticism.Ken M. Levy - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (3):458-73.
    I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second, a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's ‘illusionist’ response to responsibility skeptics – that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should maintain a responsibility‐realist/retributivist criminal justice (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Has social constructionism about race outlived its usefulness? Perspectives from a race skeptic.Adam Hochman - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1-20.
    The phrase ‘social constructionism about race’ is so ambiguous that it is unable to convey anything very meaningful. I argue that the various versions of social constructionism about race are either false, overly broad, or better described as anti-realism about biological race. One of the central rhetorical purposes of social constructionism about race has been to serve as an alternative to biological racial realism. However, most versions of social constructionism about race are compatible with biological racial realism, and there are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Philosophical Scepticism and the Photographic Event.Dawn M. Wilson - 2012 - In Jan-Erik Lundström & Liv Stoltz (eds.), Thinking Photography - Using Photography. Stockholm: Centrum för Fotografi. pp. 98-109.
    The puzzle that concerns me is whether it is possible to establish a substantive difference between photographic images and other kinds of visual image, which can explain the special epistemic and aesthetic qualities of photographs, without giving way to scepticism about photographic art. In this essay I offer a philosophical account of the photographic process which is able to resolve this tension. I use this account to argue that, while some photographs are mind independent, mind independence is not a defining (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Constructivism: Social Discourse & Knowledge.Jesús Aparicio de Soto - 2022 - Scientific Research, an Academic Publisher (OJPP) 12 (3):376-396.
    Constructivism is frequently met with objections, criticism and often equated with nihilism or relativism. Sometimes even blamed for what some would randomly picture as unwanted side effects of radicalism or of a progressivist era: such misconceptions are not only due to an imprecise grasp of the premises shared by the constructivist family of systems. The structure of media, political systems, and economic models, still up today impel societal understandings of knowledge on neo-positivistic grounds. The first part of this essay outlines (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Against structural skepticism: Max Gluckman’s response to Elizabeth Colson.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    A quite recent book casts the anthropologist Elizabeth Colson as a systems skeptic, with Max Gluckman attempting to counter her skepticism. In this paper, I offer clarifications of the skepticism and of the counter.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Moral Responsibility in the Age of Free Will Skepticism: A Defence of Frankfurtian-Compatibilism.Owen Jeffrey Crocker - 2022 - Compos Mentis: Undergraduate Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 10 (1):1-19.
    Free will skepticism is radical in its core claim that free will is illusory. Criminal law, however, appears to presuppose that persons are free and hence, morally responsible for their actions. So, if free will skepticism is true, our current practices that hold people to account for their wrongs appears unjustified–even immoral. This paper will challenge the free will skeptic’s core claim that free will does not exist and defend current practices of moral responsibility by offering (and defending) a Frankfurtian-compatibilist (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Ethan Mills, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. [REVIEW]Oren Hanner - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):353-358.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Causal Connections, Logical Connections, and Skeptical Theism: There Is No Logical Problem of Evil.Perry Hendricks - forthcoming - Religions.
    In this paper, I consider Sterba’s recent criticism of skeptical theism in context of his argument from evil. I show that Sterba’s criticism of skeptical theism shares an undesirable trait with all past criticisms of skeptical theism: it fails. This is largely due to his focus on causal connections and his neglect of logical connections. Because of this, his argument remains vulnerable to skeptical theism.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Meaning in time: on temporal externalism and Kripkenstein’s skeptical challenge.Jaakko Reinikainen - 2022 - Synthese 200 (288):1-27.
    The main question of metasemantics, or foundational semantics, is why an expression token has the meaning (semantic value) that it in fact has. In his reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, Saul Kripke presented a skeptical challenge that threatened to make the foundational question unanswerable. My first contention in this paper is that the skeptical challenge indeed poses an insoluble paradox, but only for a certain kind of metasemantic theory, against which the challenge effectively works as a reductio ad absurdum (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Aenesidemus: Title, Indication of Contents, Preface.Robb Dunphy - manuscript
    G.E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, despite its importance for the development of post-Kantian idealism, has not been fully translated into English. Now and then, when I have time, I will upload draft translations of parts of the text here, with the goal of, at some point, providing a complete translation. These drafts will be rough and I welcome feedback! -/- This document contains only the Title page, Schulze's indication of the contents of the work, and the preface.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Cosmic Skepticism and the Beginning of Physical Reality (Doctoral Dissertation).Linford Dan - 2022 - Dissertation, Purdue University
    This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. The Propagation of Suspension of judgment. Or, should we confer any weight to crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant?Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment "propagates" from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Hayek, Scepticism, and Democracy: A Wittgensteinian Critique.Robert Vinten - 2021 - Dewey Studies 5 (2):109-119.
    Given the multiple crises that are occurring after decades of neoliberalism we should take care to examine neoliberalism’s claims and subject them to critical scrutiny. What I propose to do here is to examine some of the philosophical claims made by Friedrich Hayek and then submit them to scrutiny using tools from Hayek’s cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 755