Skepticism

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
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  1. Cosmic Skepticism and the Beginning of Physical Reality (Doctoral Dissertation).Linford Dan - 2022 - Dissertation, Purdue University
    This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause (...)
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  2. The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment. Or, Should We Confer Any Weight to Crucial Objections the Truth-Value of Which We Are Ignorant?Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment "propagates" from (...)
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  3. Getting Accurate About Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind:1-28.
    There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favor, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some (...)
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  4. Hayek, Scepticism, and Democracy: A Wittgensteinian Critique.Robert Vinten - 2021 - Dewey Studies 5 (2):109-119.
    Given the multiple crises that are occurring after decades of neoliberalism we should take care to examine neoliberalism’s claims and subject them to critical scrutiny. What I propose to do here is to examine some of the philosophical claims made by Friedrich Hayek and then submit them to scrutiny using tools from Hayek’s cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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  5. "Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University
    I discuss three understandings of the idea of “Knowledge First Epistemology”, i.e. Timothy Williamson’s suggestion that we should take knowledge as a starting point, rather than trying to analyze it. Some have taken this to be a suggestion about the role of the concept of knowledge, but Williamson also seems to be concerned with intuition-based metaphysics. As an alternative, I develop the idea that knowledge may be a social kind that can be understood through a functional analysis in the tradition (...)
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  6. Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):434-453.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 2, Page 434-453, March 2022.
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  7. Socratic Scepticism.Roger Wertheimer - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-362.
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  8. The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan.Kok Yong Lee - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding (...)
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  9. The Subjective Deduction and Kant’s Methodological Skepticism.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2022 - In Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting & Udo Thiel (eds.), Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception. Berlin, Germany: pp. 341-60.
    The deduction of categories in the 1781 edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason (A Deduction) has “two sides”—the “objective deduction” and the “subjective deduction”. Kant seems ambivalent about the latter deduction. I treat it as a significant episode of Kant’s thinking about categories that extended from the early 1770s to around 1790. It contains his most detailed answer to the question about the origin of categories that he formulated in the 1772 letter to Marcus Herz. The answer is (...)
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  10. Dialectical Pyrrhonism: Montaigne, Sextus Empiricus, and the Self-Overcoming of Philosophy.Roger Eichorn - 2022 - Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 24 (13):24-46.
    In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne’s thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel’s progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne’s thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hartle’s claim that (...)
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  11. Humble Theism: Wykstra’s Skeptical Theism and Moral Paralysis.Soren Moody - manuscript
    William L. Rowe cites Stephen Wykstra's skeptical theism as the most powerful objection to the evidential argument. Initially, I object to skeptical theism on the basis that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis. I then will conclude that the skeptical theist has other resources that enable the formation of a moral code.
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  12. Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva & Louis Doulas - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge.
    This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.
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  13. Concessive Knowledge Attributions Cannot Be Explained Pragmatically.Gregory Stoutenburg - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-12.
    “I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David Lewis, have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences sound odd, and thus do not undermine fallibilism. I argue that the proffered pragmatic explanations fail and I raise challenges for any possible pragmatic explanation of the character of concessive knowledge attributions. It is reasonable (...)
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  14. Tragic Flaws.Nathan Ballantyne - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):20-40.
    In many tragic plays, the protagonist is brought down by a disaster that is a consequence of the protagonist's own error, his or her hamartia, the tragic flaw. Tragic flaws are disconcerting to the audience because they are not known or fully recognized by the protagonist—at least not until it is too late. In this essay, I take tragic flaws to be unreliable belief-forming dispositions that are unrecognized by us in some sense. I describe some different types of flaws and (...)
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  15. The Kind of Blame Skeptics Should Be Skeptical About.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):401-415.
    Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...)
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  16. Weaponized Skepticism: An Analysis of Social Media Deception as Applied Political Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2021 - In Elizabeth Edenburg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 31-48.
    Since at least 2016, many have worried that social media enables authoritarians to meddle in democratic politics. The concern is that trolls and bots amplify deceptive content. In this chapter I argue that these tactics have a more insidious anti-democratic purpose. Lies implanted in democratic discourse by authoritarians are often intended to be caught. Their primary goal is not to successfully deceive, but rather to undermine the democratic value of testimony. In well-functioning democracies, our mutual reliance on testimony also generates (...)
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  17. The Rise of Religious Skepticism in the Seventeenth Century.Michael W. Hickson & Thomas M. Lennon - 2018 - In Dan Kaufman (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth-century Philosophy. New York, NY, USA: pp. 563-582.
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  18. Varieties of Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy: Pierre-Daniel Huet and Simon Foucher.Michael W. Hickson - 2018 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. London, UK: pp. 320-341.
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  19. Retributivism, Free Will Skepticism, and the Public Health-Quarantine Model: Replies to Kennedy, Walen, Corrado, Sifferd, Pereboom, and Shaw.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):161-216.
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  20. Meta‐Skepticism.Risberg Olle - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  21. Free Will Skepticism and Criminals as Ends in Themselves.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. New York:
    This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse which can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones which can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified Rawlsian original position (...)
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  22. If We Can’T Tell What Theism Predicts, We Can’T Tell Whether God Exists: Skeptical Theism and Bayesian Arguments From Evil.Nevin Climenhaga - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    According to a simple Bayesian argument from evil, the evil we observe is less likely given theism than given atheism, and therefore lowers the probability of theism. I consider the most common skeptical theist response to this argument, according to which our cognitive limitations make the probability of evil given theism inscrutable. I argue that if skeptical theists are right about this, then the probability of theism given evil is itself largely inscrutable, and that if this is so, we ought (...)
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  23. Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) has been thought to solve the conditionality problem for epistemic externalism. This problem arises from externalists’ characterization of our epistemic standings as conditional on the obtaining of worldly facts which we lack any reflective access to. ED is meant to avoid the conditionality problem by explicating subjects’ perceptual knowledge in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge via their possession of perceptual reasons that are both factive and reflectively accessible. I argue that ED’s account of reflectively accessible factive perceptual (...)
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  24. A New Cartesian Inconsistency: Moral Skepticism, The Excusing Condition, and Progress.Saja Parvizian - manuscript
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  25. Skeptik Teizm ve Kötülük: Peter van Inwagen'ın "Minimum-Yok İddiası".Atilla Akalın - 2021 - Theosophia 3 (3):77-90.
    Skeptical theists are seeking for some reasonable solutions to the evidential problem of evil. One of the most fundamental responses of skeptical theism is that the concept of “gratuitous evil”, which cannot be a proof of the absence of God. Therefore, it is not the existence of God that skeptical theism suspects. Instead, skeptical theism contemplates whether the evil in the world really has a “gratuitous” basis. This paper focuses on Peter van Inwagen's “no-minimum claim”. No-minimum claim” stands in opposition (...)
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  26. Spirit Calls Nature: Bridging Science and Spirituality, Consciousness and Evolution in a Synthesis of Knowledge.Marco Masi - 2021 - Indy Edition.
    This is a technical treatise for the scientific-minded readers trying to expand their intellectual horizon beyond the straitjacket of materialism. It is dedicated to those scientists and philosophers who feel there is something more, but struggle with connecting the dots into a more coherent picture supported by a way of seeing that allows us to overcome the present paradigm and yet maintains a scientific and conceptual rigor, without falling into oversimplifications. Most of the topics discussed are unknown even to neuroscientists, (...)
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  27. The Concept of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Knowledge is central to epistemology. Indeed, the word ‘epistemology’ comes from the Greek word epistêmê, which is often translated as ‘knowledge.’ But what is knowledge? Why do we value it? How is it acquired? And how much of it do we have? This article explores the nature, significance, sources, and extent of human knowledge.
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  28. Skepticism and the crisis of criteria.Mašan Bogdanovski - 2021 - In Nenad Cekić (ed.), Етика и истина у доба кризе. Belgrade: University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy. pp. 181-192.
    This paper analyzes the way in which skepticism led to the crisis of the criteria of truth and action that developed in Stoic philosophy. The attempts of the skeptics to escape the difficulties caused by their radical philosophical views are presented. Special attention was paid to the importance that yielding to the customs and traditions of the community in which they lived had in the life of skeptics deprived of these criteria. This approach to action and problem solving in general (...)
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  29. Once Again From the Beginning: On the Relationship of Skepticism and Philosophy in Hegel's System.Miles Hentrup - 2016 - Dissertation, Stony Brook University
    This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its legitimate role within the (...)
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  30. Skepticism and the Value of Distrust.Maria Baghramian & Silvia Panizza - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic (...)
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  31. Nekontekstualistička i kontekstualistička verzija teorije relevantnih alternativa kao moguća rešenja skeptičkog paradoksa.Milica Smajevic Roljic - 2014 - Theoria: Beograd 3 (57):23-41.
    U ovom radu analizira se rešenje skeptičkog paradoksa koje pruža teorija relevantnih alternativa. Ispituju se i upoređuju dve verzije ovog rešenja: nekontekstualistič- ka čiji je tvorac i zastupnik Fred Drecke, i kontekstualistička koju zastupaju autori poput Kita Dirouza i Stjuarta Koena. Uporednom analizom nekontekstualističkog i kontekstuali- stičkog rešenja, dolazi se do zaključka da, iako oba rešenja imaju i povoljne i nepovoljne implikacije, Dreckeova teorija relevantnih alternativa nudi uverljivije objašnjenje, a zatim i rešenje skeptičkog paradoksa.
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  32. The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Peter Thielke (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena. Cambridge: Cambridge. pp. 111-132.
    The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (...)
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  33. Should We Be Skeptics or Contextualists About Counterfactual Conditionals?Yael Loewenstein - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
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  34. Making Sense of Thompson Clarke's "The Legacy of Skepticism".Roger Eichorn - 2021 - Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 23 (12):70-102.
    Thompson Clarke’s seminal paper “The Legacy of Skepticism” (1972) is notoriously difficult in both substance and presentation. Despite the paper’s importance to skepticism studies in the nearly half-century since its publication, no attempt has been made in the secondary literature to provide an account, based on a close reading of the text, of just what Clarke’s argument is. Furthermore, much of the existing literature betrays (or so it seems to me) fundamental misunderstandings of Clarke’s thought. In this essay, I attempt (...)
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  35. Levelling Counterfactual Scepticism.Katie Steele & Alexander Sandgren - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):927-947.
    In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statements of scientific law often include an implicit ceteris paribus clause that restricts the (...)
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  36. Skeptical Doubts.Kathrin Koslicki - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. London, UK: pp. 164-179.
    This chapter reviews several varieties of grounding skepticism as well as responses that have been proposed by grounding enthusiasts to considerations raised by grounding skeptics. Grounding skeptics, as I conceive of them here, are theorists who belong to one of the following two schools of thought. “Old-school” grounding skeptics doubt the theoretical utility of the grounding idiom by denying one of its presuppositions, viz., that this notion is at least intelligible or coherent. “Second-generation” grounding skeptics call into question the theoretical (...)
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  37. Full-Blooded Conceptual Realism as a Response to Skeptical Relativism.Phillips-Gray Micah - 2021 - Stance 14:52-66.
    In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some aspect, (...)
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  38. Modernism, Postmodernism, and Ultra-Modernism: The Difference and the Continuity.Muhammad Jalil Arif - 2021 - Academic Letter 1 (Article 3112).
    This paper briefly presents the historical and philosophical link between Enlightenment philosophy and the emergence of Postmodern philosophy, i.e., the transition from modernity to postmodernity. While identifying and recognizing the “difference” and the sharp contrast, I will concentrate on showing the “continuity” between the two philosophies. This paper shows that postmodernism can be understood as ultra-modernism in at least two dimensions 1) in opting for a particular critical methodology and 2) in the intensification of subjectivity. This enactment of deconstructive criticism, (...)
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  39. Mathematical Skepticism: A Sketch with Historian in Foreground.Luciano Floridi - 1998 - In J. van der Zande & R. Popkin (eds.), The Skeptical Tradition around 1800. Dordrecht, Netherlands: pp. 41–60.
    We know very little about mathematical skepticism in modem times. Imre Lakatos once remarked that “in discussing modem efforts to establish foundations for mathematical knowledge one tends to forget that these are but a chapter in the great effort to overcome skepticism by establishing foundations for knowledge in general." And in a sense he was clearly right: modem thought — with its new discoveries in mathematical sciences, the mathematization of physics, the spreading of Pyrrhonist doctrines, the centrality of epistemological foundationalism (...)
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  40. Procurando razões [Looking for reasons].Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - manuscript
    The subject of this book came up in several different places and dates, scattered in my experience in the countless times I was asked to think, discuss or pronounce myself on the idea that we have (or should have) an ability to judge that is part of our human nature, that we have the power to weigh our own opinions and, with this, conduct our lives and carry out the valuable tasks of properly knowing the world and properly deciding what (...)
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  41. Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World".Christopher Stratman - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume (...)
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  42. The Importance of Being Earnest: Peirce's Interpretation of Scepticism.Luciano Floridi - 1998 - In Jaap Van Brakel & Michael van Heerden (eds.), C. S. Peirce: Categories to Constantinople - Proceedings of the International Symposium on Peirce, Leuven 1997 (Louvain Philosophical Studies). Leuven, Belgium: pp. 47-60.
    This paper focuses on what Peirce means by scepticism, with particular reference to the anticartesian nature of his philosophy and the question of whether Peirce constantly shows a univocal and consistent attitude towards all types of scepticism. It argues that Peirce can be described as an antisceptic, and then goes on to discuss the extent to which Peirce’s fallibilism can claim to succeed in entirely divorcing itself from a sceptical outlook. -/- .
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  43. Richard H. Popkin: Scepticism in the History of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Luciano Floridi - 1999 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):157–159.
    This publication is a review of RIchard H. Popkin's Scepticism in the History of Philosophy.
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  44. The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.
    Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...)
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  45. Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2021 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidential Anti-Scepticism.
    In her book Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology (2015), Annalisa Coliva puts forward an anti-sceptical proposal based on the idea that the notion of rationality extends to the unwarrantable presuppositions “that make the acquisition of perceptual warrants possible” (2015: 150). These presuppositions are commonly the target of sceptical arguments, and by showing that they are on the one hand unwarrantable, but on the other are constitutive components of rationality itself, she reveals that they are beyond rational doubt and thus avoids (...)
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  46. Time's Arrow and Self‐Locating Probability.Eddy Keming Chen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    One of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics is what gives rise to the arrow of time. Since the fundamental dynamical laws of physics are (essentially) symmetric in time, the explanation for time's arrow must come from elsewhere. A promising explanation introduces a special cosmological initial condition, now called the Past Hypothesis: the universe started in a low-entropy state. Unfortunately, in a universe where there are many copies of us (in the distant ''past'' or the distant ''future''), (...)
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  47. Personal Information as Symmetry Breaker in Disagreements.Diego E. Machuca - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (1):51-70.
    When involved in a disagreement, a common reaction is to tell oneself that, given that the information about one’s own epistemic standing is clearly superior in both amount and quality to the information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing, one is justified in one’s confidence that one’s view is correct. In line with this natural reaction to disagreement, some contributors to the debate on its epistemic significance have claimed that one can stick to one’s guns by relying in part on information (...)
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  48. Psychosis and Intelligibility.Sofia Jeppsson - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (3):233-249.
    When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. (...)
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  49. Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for The Philosophy of Evidence.
    According to the ‘Evidential Internalists’, one’s evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive mental states. ‘Evidential Externalists’ deny that, and allow for external factors to determine what evidence one has. After clarifying what Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism entail, and what they are silent on, this chapter provides an opinionated overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism. It concludes that Evidential Externalism is a more promising view.
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  50. The Point of Moore’s Proof.Charles Raff - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.
    The current standard interpretation of Moore’s proof assumes he offers a solution to Kant’s famously posed problem of an external world, which Moore quotes at the start of his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” As a solution to Kant’s problem, Moore’s proof would fail utterly. A second received interpretation imputes an aim of refuting metaphysical idealism that Moore’s proof does not at all achieve. This study departs from received interpretations to credit the aim Moore announced for the proof (...)
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