Skepticism

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
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  1. The Point of Moore’s Proof.Charles Raff - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.
    The current standard interpretation of Moore’s proof assumes he offers a solution to Kant’s famously posed problem of an external world, which Moore quotes at the start of his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” As a solution to Kant’s problem, Moore’s proof would fail utterly. A second received interpretation imputes an aim of refuting metaphysical idealism that Moore’s proof does not at all achieve. This study departs from received interpretations to credit the aim Moore announced for the proof (...)
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  2. A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.
    I present a cumulative case for the thesis that we only know propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this thesis can easily explain the truth of eight plausible claims about knowledge: -/- (1) There is a qualitative difference between knowledge and non-knowledge. (2) Knowledge is valuable in a way that non-knowledge is not. (3) Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge. (4) If S knows that P, P is part of S’s evidence. (5) If S knows (...)
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  3. Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview.Nikolaj Jang Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill:
    This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.
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  4. The Normality of Error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...)
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  5. Williams Contextualism as a Critique of Epistemological Realism.Milos Bogdanovic - 2019 - Theoria: Beograd 62 (1):91-102.
    Although Williams’ contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams’ position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of (...)
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  6. Notre héritage du scepticisme n'est précédé d'aucun testament.Par-delà les vicissitudes de l'épistémologie traditionnelle et de l'anti-scepticisme, le spectre du "scepticisme à visage humain" selon Thompson Morgan Clarke, entre contextualisme, perspectivisme, pragmatisme et pyrrhonisme.Stéphane Cormier - 2021 - Sképsis 11 ((23)Clarke's Legacy and Hinge Ep):122-147.
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  7. Editors’ Note.Diego Machuca & Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):185-186.
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  8. A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixos.Carvalho Eros - forthcoming - In Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma interpretação e debate do Sobre a Certeza, de Wittgenstein. São Paulo:
    Neste texto, discuto a interpretação defendida por Moyal-Sharrock, segundo a qual as proposições eixo são maneiras de agir com o objetivo de oferecer uma proposta sobre como compreendê-las. Sustento que a posição de Moyal-Sharrock deixa algumas lacunas, porque não explica a origem das nossas certezas fundamentais. A sua leitura também carece de recursos para responder ao problema da demarcação, uma vez que não é claro como distinguir maneiras de agir que podem legitimamente cumprir o papel de fundamento não fundamentado das (...)
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  9. Consciousness's Conceptualizations.Ulrich de Balbian - manuscript
    Exploration of phenomena that need to be considered so as to conceptualize consciousness types of different biological organisms or living things, levels, dimensions, aims, types, stages of the process of consciousness and organs involved.
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  10. Does My Total Evidence Support That I’M a Boltzmann Brain?Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3717-3723.
    A Boltzmann Brain, haphazardly formed through the unlikely but still possible random assembly of physical particles, is a conscious brain having experiences just like an ordinary person. The skeptical possibility of being a Boltzmann Brain is an especially gripping one: scientific evidence suggests our actual universe’s full history may ultimately contain countless short-lived Boltzmann Brains with experiences just like yours or mine. I propose a solution to the skeptical challenge posed by these countless actual Boltzmann Brains. My key idea is (...)
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  11. Who’s Pulling Our Wires?: Are We Living in an Imposed ‘Matrix’ Simulation?I. W. Kelly - manuscript
    The aptly called “simulation hypothesis” is the latest version of the historical skeptical philosophical speculation. The simulation hypothesis in its contemporary form is tied to sense inputs from sources (typically technologically based) other than external objects in the immediate environment. Let’s explore this: so why might some people take the modern-day philosophical simulation hypothesis seriously, and others think it is a bunch of covfefe? A wide-ranging consideration of the belief that we are living in a simulated world. Considers both philosophical (...)
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  12. Skeptical Doubting and Mindful Self-Reflection.Guido Melchior - 2013 - In Mind, Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276.
    The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I (...)
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  13. Knowledge and Representations: Explaining the Skeptical Puzzle.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (ed.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Papers of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 150-152.
    (*This paper was awarded the Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner Award 2017 for outstanding contributions.) -/- This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an attached point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a detached point view. From an attached point of (...)
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  14. No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2020 - Synthese:1-24.
    On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...)
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  15. Review of The End of Morality: Taking Abolitionism Seriously, Ed. R. Joyce & R. Garner. [REVIEW]Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-6.
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  16. The Role of Skepticism in the Emergence of German Idealism.Michael Baur - 1999 - In Michael Baur & Daniel Dahlstrom (eds.), The Emergence of German Idealism. Washington, DC, USA: pp. 63-91.
    According to Immanuel Kant’s well-known account of his own intellectual development, it was the skeptic David Hume who roused him from his dogmatic slumber. According to some popular accounts of post-Kantian philosophy, it was the soporific speculation of the idealists that quickly returned German philosophy to the Procrustean bed of unverifiable metaphysics, where it dogmatically slept for half of the nineteenth century. This popular picture of post-Kantian German philosophy receives some apparent support from the relevant evidence. After all, Kant had (...)
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  17. Adam Smith. Skeptical Newtonianism, Disenchanted Republicanism, and the Birth of Social Science.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1989 - In Marcelo Dascal & Ora Gruengrad (eds.), Knowledge and Politics: Case Studies on the Relationship between Epistemology and Political Philosophy. Boulder, Co, USA: Westview Press. pp. 83-110.
    Both Adam Smith's epistemology and his politics head to a stalemate. The former is under the opposing pulls of an essentialist ideal of knowledge and of a pragmatist approach to the history of science. The latter still tries to provide a foundation for a natural law, while conceiving it as non-absolute and changeable. The consequences are (i) inability to complete both the political and the epistemological works projected by Smith; (ii) decentralization of the social order, giving rise to several partial (...)
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  18. Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson capa-strawson-edufsccom a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual.Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luis Gelain - 2005 - Florianópolis, SC, Brasil: Editora da UFSC.
    Sumário. Apresentação. PARTE I. 1. O legado filosófico de P. F. Strawson, Itamar Luís Gelain e Jaimir Conte; 2 . Strawson e o caso dos metafísicos descritivos, Itamar Luís Gelain; 3. Metafísica e linguagem comum: sobre uma conturbada herança wittgensteiniana de Strawson, Jônadas Techio; 4. Strawson e Descartes, Albertinho Luiz Gallina; 5. Strawson: sobre Kant e Berkeley, Robert Calabria; 6. O empirismo pós-kantiano de Strawson, Wenceslao J. González; 7. Reabilitando Strawson, Marco Antonio Franciotti; 8. Strawson e o ceticismo em Individuals, (...)
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  19. O typach kawy. Kontekstualizm DeRose’a jako strategia antysceptycka (On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy).Tomasz Szubart - 2018 - Analiza I Egzystencja 4 (44):61-81.
    Semantic contextualism is often used in order to offer solutions for problems in other branches of philosophy, including epistemology. One of such attempts is epistemic contextualism, according to which the semantic value of the word “knows” changes with the context of its utterance. The aim of this paper is to critically investigate Keith DeRose’s contextualism to see up to what extent does it provide a valid anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that while it can be seen as a good rival for (...)
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  20. Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2018 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Oxford, UK: pp. 186–205.
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  21. Le scepticisme et les hypothèses de la physique.Sophie Roux - 1998 - Revue de Synthèse 119 (2-3):211-255.
    The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of (...)
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  22. Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality.Giovanni Rolla - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (3):5-28.
    Based on Pritchard's distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness. This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call (...)
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  1. The Skeptic and the Climate Change Skeptic.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.
    Outside the philosophy classroom, global skeptics – skeptics about all (purported) knowledge of the external world – are rare. But there are people who describe themselves as “skeptics” about various more specific domains, including self-professed “skeptics” about the reality of anthropogenic climate change. There is little to no philosophical literature that juxtaposes the climate change skeptic with the external world skeptic. While many “traditional” epistemologists assume that the external world skeptic poses a serious philosophical challenge in a way that the (...)
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Brains in Vats
  1. Underdetermination and Closure: Thoughts on Two Sceptical Arguments.Martin Smith - forthcoming - In Matthew Jope & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.
    In this paper, I offer reasons for thinking that two prominent sceptical arguments in the literature – the underdetermination-based sceptical argument and the closure-based sceptical argument – are less philosophically interesting than is commonly supposed. The underdetermination-based argument begs the question against a non-sceptic and can be dismissed with little fanfare. The closure-based argument, though perhaps not question-begging per se, does rest upon contentious assumptions that a non-sceptic is under no pressure to accept.
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  2. Idealism and Illusions.Robert Smithson - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):137-151.
    According to the idealist, facts about phenomenal experience determine facts about the physical world. Any such view must account for illusions: cases where there is a discrepancy between the physical world and our experiences of it. In this paper, I critique some recent idealist treatments of illusions before presenting my own preferred account. I then argue that, initial impressions notwithstanding, it is actually the realist who has difficulties properly accounting for illusions.
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  3. We Can't Know.Markus Lammenranta - 2020 - In Steven Cowan (ed.), Problems in Epistemology and Metaphysics : An Introduction to Contemporary Debates. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 38-51.
    The paper defends Cartesian skepticism by an argument relying on internalism and infallibilism. It argues that this sort of skepticism gives the best explanation of our intuitions and ordinary epistemic practices.
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  4. Die ganze Welt ist eine Bühne: Zur Ökologie und Ontologie menschlicher und tierischer Lebenswelt.Barry Smith - 2004 - Interdisziplinäre Phänomenologie / Interdisciplinary Phenomenology (Kyoto) 1:31-44.
    Die klassische bikategoriale Ontologie von Substanzen und Akzidentien ist für die Festlegung der Strukturen menschlichen und tierischen Verhaltens nicht hinreichend, da die Umwelten dieses Verhaltens sich nicht in dieses klassische System einfügen. Wir bieten dementsprechend den Grundriß einer Theorie der besonderen Gebilde, die die Alltagswelten menschlicher und tierischer Verhalten konstituieren. Die Ausgangsüberlegung ist die folgende, Wir sind alle (Schau)spieler, und diese brauchen eine Bühne. Unsere Bühne ist die jeweilige Umwelt, in der wir leben und handeln. Der Terminus ‘Umwelt’ wird hierbei (...)
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  5. Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):624-656.
    Epistemological disjunctivism is a philosophical theory that has received special attention in the recent years. Particularly because it has been seen by many as a way of renewing discussions that range from the nature of justification of our daily beliefs to the possibility of unveiling the structure of the problem of radical skepticism and of responding to it. Duncan Pritchard is one of the authors who have offered a particular view of disjunctivism and ways of conceiving of disjunctivist treatments to (...)
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  6. Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (12):625-660.
    Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been motivated using verificationism, (...)
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  7. Ignorance and Knowledge: The Viability of Externalist Neo-Mooreanism as a Resonse to Radical Scepticism.John Asquith - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Here, I shall be examining the viability of a Moorean response to the Argument from Ignorance; i.e., one that tries to rebut the argument by denying its first premise that we cannot have knowledge that we are not BIVs. After first explicating the Argument from Ignorance in detail, I then go on to try and motivate this approach by critically examining two alternative approaches to dealing with radical scepticism: closure-denial, and attributer contextualism. Finding them wanting, I then turn to a (...)
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  8. Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad.Sean M. Carroll - forthcoming - In Shamik Dasgupta & Brad Weslake (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Some modern cosmological models predict the appearance of Boltzmann Brains: observers who randomly fluctuate out of a thermal bath rather than naturally evolving from a low-entropy Big Bang. A theory in which most observers are of the Boltzmann Brain type is generally thought to be unacceptable, although opinions differ. I argue that such theories are indeed unacceptable: the real problem is with fluctuations into observers who are locally identical to ordinary observers, and their existence cannot be swept under the rug (...)
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  9. What to Believe About Your Belief That You're in the Good Case.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6:206-233.
    Going about our daily lives in an orderly manner requires us, once we are aware of them, to dismiss many metaphysical possibilities. We take it for granted that we are not brains in vats, or living in the Matrix, or in an extended dream. Call these things that we take for granted “anti-skeptical assumptions”. What should a reflective agent who believes these things think of these beliefs? For various reasons, it can seem that we do not have evidence for such (...)
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  10. How to Undercut Radical Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1299-1321.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  11. The New Evil Demon and the Devil in the Details.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 102-122.
    I will argue that cases of massive deception, such as New Evil Demon cases, as well as one-off cases of local deception present challenges to views according to which epistemic reasons, epistemic warrant, epistemic rationality or epistemic norms are factive. In doing so, I will argue is that proponents of a factive turn in epistemology should observe important distinctions between what are often simply referred to as ‘bad cases.’ Recognizing epistemologically significant differences between deception cases raises serious challenges for those (...)
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  12. Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential Externalism (...)
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  13. A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (3):381-390.
    The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...)
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  14. An Argument for External World Skepticism From the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.
    In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical (...)
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  15. Transcendental Arguments, Conceivability, and Global Vs. Local Skepticism.Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):735-749.
    In this paper, I argue that, if transcendental arguments are to proceed from premises that are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a metaphysically necessary condition for the possibility of Y,” must be grounded in considerations of conceivability and possibility. More explicitly, the Transcendental Premise is based on what Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne call the “conceivability-possibility move.” This “inconceivability-impossibility” move, however, is a problematic argumentative move when advancing transcendental arguments for the following reasons. First, (...)
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  16. The Limits of Realism, by Tim Button. 264 + Xi P., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013. [REVIEW]Nathan Wildman - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (3):433-37.
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  17. Escepticismo y Desacuerdo.Rodrigo Laera - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):81-97.
    Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...)
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  18. The Limits of Realism.Tim Button - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where.
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  19. Putnam on Brains-in-Vats and Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press.
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  20. The Skeptic's Dogmatism: A Constructive Response to the Skeptical Problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation,
    The problem of philosophical skepticism relates to the difficulty involved in underwriting the claim that we know anything of spatio-temporal reality. It is often claimed, in fact, that proper philosophical scrutiny reveals quite the opposite from what common sense suggests. Knowledge of external reality is thought to be even quite obviously denied to us as a result of the alleged fact that we all fail to know that certain skeptical scenarios do not obtain. A skeptical scenario is one in which (...)
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  21. Der antiskeptische Boden unter dem Gehirn im Tank. Eine transzendentale Fingerübung mit Intensionen.Olaf Müller - 2001 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (4):516 - 539.
    Crispin Wright hat die bislang beste Rekonstruktion von Putnams Beweis gegen die skeptische Hypothese vom Gehirn im Tank vorgelegt. Aber selbst in Wrights Fassung hat der Beweis einen Mangel: Er wird mithilfe eines Prädikates wie z.B. "Tiger" geführt und funktioniert nur, wenn man sich darauf verlassen kann, dass es Tiger wirklich gibt. Aber die Skeptikerin bestreitet, über die Existenz von Tigern bescheid zu wissen. Das Problem lässt sich dadurch beheben, dass man den Beweis – statt mit dem extensionalen Begriff der (...)
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  22. Reliabilism and Brains in Vats.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.
    According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism (...)
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  23. What Is Realistic About Putnam’s Internal Realism?David L. Anderson - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):49-83.
    Failure to recognize the "realistic" motivations for Putnam's commitment to internal realism has led to a widely shared misunderstanding of Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. Realist critics of these arguments frequently offer rebuttals that fail to confront his arguments. Simply put, Putnam's arguments --the brains in a vat argument as well as the model-theoretic argument -- are "reductios" that are intended to show that "metaphysical realism itself is not sufficiently realistic". If that claim can be substantiated then Putnam can go (...)
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  24. Semantic Pragmatism and a Priori Knowledge: (Or 'Yes We Could All Be Brains in a Vat').Henry Jackman - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455-480.
    Hillary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, his original use of the brain in a vat scenario was meant to illustrate a point about the "mind/world relationship." In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of (...)
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  25. Does Putnam's Argument Beg the Question Against the Skeptic? Bad News for Radical Skepticism.Olaf Müller - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):299-320.
    Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and externalism) can be (...)
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  26. A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism.Peter Murphy - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):693-706.
    This article offers a novel sceptical argument that the sensitivity-contextualist must say is sound; moreover, she must say that the conclusion of thisargument is true at ordinary standards. The view under scrutiny has it that in different contexts knowledge-attributing sentences express different propositions, propositions which differ in the stretch of worlds across which the subject is required to track the truth. I identify the underlying reason for the sceptical result and argue that it makes sensitivity-contextualism irremediably flawed. Contextualists, I conclude, (...)
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  27. Reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats.Harold W. Noonan - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):59-62.
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